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Journalistic reporting normalized radical lone wolf terrorist activities compromising 
public and national safety. The purpose of this research was to explore news reports of 
four radical lone wolf events that occurred in New York City (NYC) between 2010 and 
2017 to identify political slant toward societal normalization of radical lone wolf 
behavior. The framework of this phenomenological study was Borum’s four-stage 
pathway mindset model of terrorism combined with Berger and Luckmann’s social 
construction theory. The central research question addressed how socially constructed 
journalism stories of lone wolf terrorist events in NYC aligned with liberal to 
conservative political newsprint continuums. Data were extrapolated from four liberal to 
conservative NYC news outlets. Using NVivo v.12 Plus data analysis software to conduct 
a thematic content analysis, the journalistic life of the associated event and isolated 
normalizing patterns led to a determination that all four news outlets contributed to 
societal construction using sensationalizing terror tactics swayed toward the outlet’s 
established political slant. Public policy addressing journalistic accountability 
considering neutrally aligned fact-based holistic reporting of terroristic events would 
critically support emergency first responders and the public to develop informed 
decisions, preparations, and actions. The resulting positive social change could improve 
communication between the public and enforcement personnel, enhance social awareness 
about lone wolf activity, enhance counter terrorism operations, and illuminate news 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
Sensational or slanted, journalism may be normalizing lone wolf terrorism 
through the social construction of radical lone wolf events resulting in societal 
normalization of preemptive warning signals. A lone wolf is indicative of a single self-
radicalized individual acting on their own volition (further explained in Chapter 2). 
Through this study, I created greater insight into whether social construction was present 
when journalists reported four specific radical lone wolf terrorist events (further 
explained in Chapter 2). Lone wolf terrorist threats included events such as suicide 
bombings and mass shootings. Understanding the part that journalism played in 
normalizing lone wolf terrorist markings is vital to public policy addressing the threats 
that lone wolf terrorists pose against society. Thus, society and policymakers must 
understand the fundamental ideas defining and understanding radical lone wolf terrorist 
activity to prevent the normalization of that activity. 
Through this study, I delved into current journalistic reports disseminated to the 
public and analyzed the ideology, behavior patterns, and socially developed constructs to 
understand better normalized social beliefs about radical lone wolf terrorist behavior. My 
findings may help recognize and thwart lone wolf terrorist behavior and facilitate 
accurate reporting of suspicious behaviors to the proper authorities. By studying the 
social constructs in journalistic reporting of lone wolf terrorism, improvement in active 
awareness may foster a society-driven system towards deterrence. United States citizens 
rely on the government and its law enforcement personnel for protection. Providing 




communities develop a comprehensive understanding of how and why lone wolves 
operate. 
Understanding lone wolf behaviors and the normalization of such supports a 
structured, organized plan to eradicate lone wolves from society. According to Sun Tzu 
(ca. 512 BCE/2003) in The Art of War, “to defeat our enemy, we must understand our 
enemy” (p. 11). Therefore, I dissected behavioral-related social norms and applied social 
constructions within publicly reported news stories to identify normalizing political slants 
about radical lone wolf terrorist attacks through my in-depth topic-related literature 
review. Thus, I evaluated social journalism reporting founding for a community’s 
response to and normalization of radical lone wolf terrorist events. 
Chapter 1 provides an overview of the research study. The chapter explains the 
study’s importance, the ontology of the study, and a summary of the research 
epistemology. Chapter 1 includes: (a) the background, (b) problem statement, (c) purpose 
of the study, (d) research question, (e) theoretical framework, (f) nature of the study, (g) 
definitions, (h) scope and delimitations, (i) limitations, (j) significance of the study, and 
(k) summary. 
Background 
A representative summary of the literature that I obtained regarding lone wolf 
terrorism supported and clarified the importance of conducting this study. Brooks (2011) 
provided a deeper understanding of the development of radical lone wolf terrorist 
behavior by analyzing prior case studies and historical literature. Brooks identified that 




problem lies with foreseeing when people turn to violence. Brooks’s findings supported 
the importance of conducting my study. Ferguson and Binks (2015) analyzed staircase 
models showing links between the religious conversion process and the radicalization 
process, thus offering insight into radicalization. Ferguson and Binks’s findings provided 
an additional foundation for understanding radicalization and communication in the lone 
wolf developmental processes.  
Logically, insight gleaned from dissecting communication activities, and 
radicalization strategies enhance U.S. counter terrorism goals. Hanle (2007) advocated 
the process, echoing the importance of understanding Al-Qaeda as an enemy and 
associated lone wolf terrorists. Hanle reiterated Sun Tzu’s (ca. 512 BCE/2003) 
admonition, “to defeat an enemy; we must know our enemy as well as he knows himself” 
(p. 11). Hanle stated that the U.S. Department of Defense and Homeland Security 
continue struggling to understand enemies and prepare effective strategies to defeat them. 
Hanle’s comments and findings fueled the importance of defining who and what 
composes the enemy. Hanle emphasized the importance of recognizing a radical lone 
wolf terrorist for U.S. National Security agencies. Additionally, Hanle’s analysis, 
definition, and validity reinforced the importance of defining the enemy (radical lone 
wolf terrorists) and, thus, the significance of my study. Hanle’s findings also provided 
direction and definition for a lone wolf community preparedness strategy. McCauley and 
Moskalenko (2014) found that Al-Qaeda and other major terrorist networks worldwide 
provided a new concern about lone wolf terrorism. McCauley and Moskalenko found that 




that lone wolf terrorism could not wholly be eradicated or defeated. Simon mentioned “a 
myth of invulnerability” within the United States, which is detrimental to developing a 
strategic response towards lone wolf terrorist attackers (p. 13). Based on these scholarly 
findings, cause for concern exists. 
The findings of Brooks (2011), Ferguson and Binks (2015), Hanle (2018), and 
McCauley and Moskalenko (2014) established that a radical lone wolf terrorist problem 
exists in the United States. Jenkins (2003) offered that the concept of terrorist attacks was 
due, in part, to social and political-based bureaucratic necessities and media structures. 
Therefore, through my study, I explored information reported in four popularly read New 
York City (NYC) news outlets to examine journalistic reporting and content influencing a 
societal construct of lone wolf terrorism normalization. 
The Gap in the Literature 
The gap in knowledge lies in explaining how the liberal to conservative political 
slant impacts the newsprint journalistic reporting of radical lone wolf events leading to 
the normalization of those terrorist activities. Journalists tend to provide their opinions 
and views about events but often slant or omit details, which is a commonly accepted 
phenomenon. Thus, the essential data critical to communicating valid societal issues 
about lone wolf terrorism become obscured by normalizing journalism; however, there 
was no existing literature exploring this phenomenon. 
Why the Study is Needed 
This study was needed to understand how journalists report radical lone wolf 




necessary to probe how journalistic political slants might be impacting the 
communication of terrorist events to the NYC populace. By exposing the normalizing 
trends of associated journalistic reporting, insight from my findings can improve public 
communication and safety. Through this research, I explored whether journalists reported 
stories that drive a societal construct leading to lone wolf terrorism normalization and a 
discrepancy in communication. In addition, I probed through digital newsprint papers in 
NYC to review reports about four specific events and whether those papers were 
politically slanting their reports about lone wolf events, leading to the normalization of 
terrorist activities. 
Problem Statement 
There is a problem wherein journalistic normalizing of terrorist behavior allows 
terrorism to continue and become worse. Journalistic reporting affects policy and 
enforcement strategies, which impact how lone wolf terrorist events are communicated to 
address terrorism through public identification of terrorist activities. If reports are slanted 
or missing data, community safety is threatened. This problem affects society and the 
way that lone wolf terrorists attack communities. Despite law enforcement efforts, 
officers throughout the United States are criticized by media reports related to the 
identification and actions of lone wolf activity before attacks occur. However, if 
investigative clues are misreported, obfuscated, or misinterpreted, enforcement officers 
cannot be adequately trained to recognize and deal with a self-radicalizing individual 
brought to their attention by citizens. Journalistic reporting may be painting an image of 




constructions of reality. I closely investigated these social constructions and journalistic 
influences on the public’s normalization of selected radicalized lone wolf terrorist events 
reported across four popular NYC news outlets with a different yet overlapping political 
readership base. 
Evidence of Consensus Considering Current Literature 
The key points regarding gender and rhetoric discussed by Gonzalez et al. (2014), 
Hewitt (2014), Michael (2012), Miller (2013), and Neumann (2013) inferred that the 
format of lone wolf attacks is distinguishable by gender, race, and ideology. Pearson 
(2015) estimated that 60 British women and girls left the United Kingdom to join the 
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) by March 2015. According to Gonzalez et al., there 
were fewer women involved in terrorism than men. However, that statement did not 
mean that women were not involved. For example, Pearson demonstrated that Roshonara 
Choudhry’s indoctrination took place via the internet. Pearson noted that Choudhry 
stabbed a member of Parliament in Britain after watching YouTube videos of Anwar Al 
Awlaki (the radical Muslim cleric). Pearson discussed the rise of female radicalization 
and noted rising concerns regarding female radicalization on the internet. Although 
Pearson’s study identified female radicalization and activity in the U.K., other scholars 
reported similar radicalization in the United States. Gonzalez et al.’s research involving 
homegrown terrorism demonstrated that women’s involvement differs by ideology and 
crime type. However, Gonzalez et al. also did not find any lone wolf terrorist women. 
I found evidence that media reports significantly influence radicalization. 




through radical rhetoric and communication. I share Bamford’s (2015) inference that 
using technological methods (i.e., the internet) increased self-radicalization potential. 
According to Bamford (2015), publications, such as Inspire Magazine, available on the 
internet, guide building crude bombs in kitchens using common chemicals and cooking 
items. However, Neumann (2013) noted that the technological phenomenon altered both 
sides of the counterterrorism equation in recent years. Neumann indicated that technical 
communication was a growing problem for law enforcement agencies to counter the 
radicalization of lone wolf terrorists. Looking at how the developmental phases of radical 
lone wolf terrorism correlate with the social construction of terrorism supports 
developing more effective deterrence strategies. 
While deterrence is helpful if the terrorist network is part of a unified group, this 
application may not apply to lone wolf terrorists (Miller, 2013). However, Michael 
(2012) argued that comprehensive strategies must be developed as an increasing number 
of soft targets (see the Definitions Section in Chapter 1) augment the likelihood of a 
probable attack. Michael’s findings were critical to maintaining a sound strategic 
approach to countering lone wolf terrorists. Hewitt (2014) reported that, in both the 
United States and Europe, there was a large and growing number of angry Jihadists and 
White Nationalists using various media to reach individuals and groups vulnerable to 





The Gap in Current Literature 
Throughout my literature review, I found no data relating to journalism and the 
normalization of terrorism in social construction; thus, current law enforcement personnel 
training lacks a critical component. This gap in current literature indicated that further 
research needed to be conducted to understand better the different variables surrounding 
the rhetoric used and the development of radical lone wolf attackers. This study, 
investigating key points involving literary reporting and communication, can improve 
community preparedness resulting in minimizing the collateral damage that radical lone 
wolf terrorist attackers pose to society. Based on that lack of current literature, there was 
a gap in understanding and little information present. Thus, I examined the social 
construction of radical lone wolf terrorism and began closing that information gap by 
probing these areas and examining ways to expose some of these issues. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of my study was to qualitatively identify and analyze how social 
construction in journalistic reporting was normalizing radical lone wolf terrorism with 
potential variations in reporting content based on journalistic styles. I accomplished this 
by coding themes and patterns in journalistic reporting associated with four popular 
NYC-based daily news outlets. According to Hewitt (2014), the United States anticipated 
an increased number of lone wolf terrorist attacks, indicating that radical lone wolf 
terrorism was a growing problem. I analyzed and identified how the social construction 
of radical lone wolf terrorism was presented in one major U.S. metropolitan city along a 




data were necessary to policymakers and enforcement trainers to evaluate approaches 
needed to inform the populace and training personnel about radical lone wolf terrorism. 
This understanding aids in evaluating positive and negative societal impacts to create 
practical social change tools to identify a self-radicalizing person. 
Research Question 
I phrased the central research question to gain further knowledge about radical 
lone wolf terrorism reporting. The question was exploratory and developed to generate a 
supposition for exploration through qualitative methods like methods discussed by Simon 
(2013). My objective was to dissect published and printed local NYC digital news outlets 
and assess the methods used to report radical lone wolf attacks. Patton (2002) believed 
that experience understanding includes attention to perceptions and meanings awakening 
conscious awareness. These components impact societies’ social construction. 
Central Research Question: How are socially constructed journalism stories of 
lone wolf terrorist events in NYC aligning with liberal to conservative political 
newsprint continuums? 
Theoretical Framework 
I based the framework for this study on Borum’s (2012a) four-stage pathway 
mindset model of terrorism. I used Borum’s model to understand better the radicalization 
process in conjunction with Berger and Luckmann’s (1966) theory of social construction. 
To help understand the radicalization process, I analyzed data on individual self-
radicalization as a foundation of ideas concerning the radicalization process and its 




model was previously used in content analysis about lone wolf terroristic attacks. My 
research followed a similar content analysis about four NYC news outlets portraying lone 
wolf terroristic attacks and terrorists. 
Borum’s Four-Stage Pathway Mindset Model of Terrorism 
Prior research illustrated that some form of radicalization takes place within lone 
wolves before an enacted terroristic behavior (Borum, 2012a; Brooks, 2011; Ferguson & 
Binks, 2015; Gonzalez et al., 2014; Hanle, 20018; Hewitt, 2014; McCauley & 
Moskalenko, 2014; Michael, 2012; Miller, 2013; Neumann, 2013). However, as Borum 
emphasized, it is essential to remember that an individual’s self-radicalization does not 
necessarily mean that a lone wolf attack is imminent. Borum discussed and developed the 
four-stage pathway mindset model of terrorism from several fundamental theories to the 
lone wolf radicalization process. Thus, Borum’s pathway model served as a qualifying 
definition for lone wolf radicalization, a thematic analysis framework, and an interpretive 
lens for this study. Hafez (2015) stated, “Porter and Kebbell define radicalization as the 
process by which individuals or groups change their beliefs, adopt an extremist 
viewpoint, and advocate or practice violence to achieve their goals” (p. 961). This theory 
was critical to my study because it provided a better interpretive outlook on how 
individuals move from pre-radicalization to radicalization.  
Major Theoretical Assumptions of Borum’s Model 
Borum’s (2012a) model consists of four stages and justifies the order in which 
each stage functions and eventually leads to the effects of radicalization (King & Taylor, 




terrorist acts after radicalization. King and Taylor offered a clear presentation of Borum’s 
model:  
• Stage 1 – The grievance stage is when the individual criticizes their social 
condition and environment as uninviting.  
• Stage 2 – During the injustice stage, the individual equates their social 
condition to more necessary and specific unjust environments and determines 
their disparity as dishonest and undeserved.  
• Stage 3 – The target attribution stage occurs once a group, or individual in the 
case of lone wolf radicalization, has been under fire as socially accountable 
and responsible for a given situation, and they are maligned and dehumanized. 
Labeling as anti-social, an outcast, or undesirable begins to be normalized in 
societies’ perceptions of these individuals or groups.  
• Stage 4 – The distancing/devaluation stage occurs when negative stereotypes 
are created about the group or individual in the case of lone wolves, and these 
stereotypes are applied and socialized to and about these outgroup members. 
Borum posited that some reasons for conversion, in the form of self or group 
radicalization, were connected to forms of religious influence or conversion or had a 
psychopathological basis for a conversion manifestation. Borum believed that 
participation was often tied to individual defects or trauma and was a leading cause of an 
individual’s conversion. Borum also highlighted the strain theory (AKA, the social 
movement theory) as an interpretive lens advancing lone wolf conversion by implying a 




life position, being unsuccessful, being unable to operate within society norms, or having 
adverse life events.  
How Borum’s Model Relates to This Study  
With this study, I identified areas of feature story reporting across liberal and 
conservative journalism, which may have directly or indirectly shaped social constructs 
and normalization of radical lone wolf persons and attacks. I further investigated areas of 
implicit bias by examining how the information on lone wolf terrorists was presented and 
disseminated. I built upon what was already known about radical lone wolf terrorists, and 
I investigated how individual journalistic efforts may have normalized media reporting of 
radical lone wolf terrorists. Borum’s (2012a) model enabled a more in-depth insight into 
the stages of radicalization from pre-radicalization through radicalization.  
Each stage describes how its development takes place. An in-depth look at each 
stage is presented in Chapter 2. Borum (2012a) inferred that communication plays a part 
in the radicalization process. Therefore, to analyze communication usage in one specific 
social setting, I recognized NYC as an integral part of its citizens’ social construction. 
Logically, the way society receives information daily can impact how society processes 
the information given. Borum’s model provided a foundation for insight into societal 
opinions concerning radical lone wolf terrorists. Reynolds (2007) emphasized that a 
scientific statement must contain empirical relevance with a measurable comparison 
statement to the phenomenon studied within a specified theoretical setting. I tested 
Borum’s model using purposeful samples, which I describe in the nature of the study 




Some relevant components to understanding the methodology behind how 
terrorist organizations materialize involve communicating rhetoric through narrative 
forms of persuasion leading to conversion. One example of this was evident on Thursday, 
October 23, 2014, when Zale Thomson, age 32, used a hatchet to attack an NYC Police 
Officer in Jamaica, NY (Prokupecz & Conlon, 2014). NY Police Department (NYPD) 
Deputy Commissioner John Miller stated that after the attack occurred, the perpetrator 
had surfed radical extremist websites with ties to the radical terrorist groups Al-Shabab 
and ISIS (Prokupecz & Conlon, 2014). I used this information to infer that some form of 
narrative persuasion played a part in the conversion process. It was equally important to 
understand how the narratives and ideology expressed by these groups intertwined in the 
radicalization process and social construction.  
Berger and Luckmann’s Social Construction Theory 
It was also essential to analyze how idea communication and societal norms were 
considered acceptable. With their theory of the social construction of reality, Berger and 
Luckmann (1966) emphasized that people combined produce environment emergent from 
the totality of the environment's socio-cultural and psychological formation. Social 
construction theory provides that there are individual formulations and experiences that 
people form and incorporate as an acceptable way of life, thus creating normalization. 
Berger and Luckmann postulated that people produce social norms and values based on 
their socio-cultural and psychological experiences. Thus, social construction theory 




behavioral connections that led people to develop beliefs and ideas about radicalization 
and the execution of radical lone wolf events.  
Basic Tenants of Social Construction Theory 
The basic tenants of social construction (Berger & Luckmann, 1966) center 
around the social development of ideas and values based on an individual’s experiences. 
Those ideas and values develop through ongoing social interaction and communication 
(Berger & Luckmann, 1966). Thus, social development, ideas, and values lead to social 
construction. Social construction dictates what is considered normal within society. 
How Social Construction Theory Relates to This Study 
Social construction theory (Berger & Luckmann, 1966) helped illustrate a rational 
interpretation for journalistic reporting of radical lone wolf events, particularly when 
those stories began to normalize the events as a current state of society. Berger and 
Luckmann emphasized that language understanding is essential to comprehend everyday 
life. This finding highlighted the importance of communication and the impact that it had 
on creating ideas and opinions. Berger and Luckmann’s theory provided an interpretive 
lens for my study by demonstrating through hypothesized constructs how people 
formulate social norms and views based on their lived or perceived experiences.  
Social construction theory (Berger & Luckmann, 1966) worked in tandem with 
Borum’s (2012a) pathway model to illustrate steps that led from pre-radicalization to 
radicalization. These components addressed the basic tenets of how individuals and 
groups radicalize and how an internal conflict occurs. These causal mechanisms provided 




process, including recruiting, indoctrinating, and radicalizing lone wolf attackers. Many 
terrorist groups use websites to post news and information which tell stories of soldiers 
and martyrs and the bounty that awaits them (Neumann, 2013). Neumann offered that 
these stories could lead to grooming behaviors centered on inciting hate and story 
rhetoric as a vehicle that resonates these critical messages in recruitment efforts. Social 
construct theory provided a foundation for linking journalistic media to social construct 
and, thus, radicalization. Examining journalistic storytelling as a tool to position and 
understand lone wolf radicalization was a necessary component of individual and societal 
construction. With this study, I delved further into these points by looking at four lone 
wolf terrorist events that occurred in NYC and were reported by four NYC news outlets 
between 2010 and 2017. 
Nature of the Study 
I grounded this research in a qualitative phenomenological approach using 
thematic content analyses of newspaper journalism in four NYC news outlets with a 
history of reporting lone wolf terroristic activities. Phenomenology centers on the lived 
experiences of individuals or groups who experience events (phenomena) bounded within 
a time and space continuum (Moustakas, 1994). Since this study centered on journalists’ 
reports of lived experiences, phenomenology was the best methodology. 
As commonly understood, journalists subjectively investigate and report their 
interpretations of the lived experiences of those involved in the reported event. With this 
study, I explored the reports of the journalists who responded to and reported about the 




research design was doubly appropriate for this study because phenomenological inquiry 
described and detailed the journalists’ perceptions (lived experiences) of the individuals 
experiencing the same phenomena: radical lone wolf terrorist events. I evaluated the 
journalists’ articles related to four lone wolf terrorist events to discover any political 
slants or societal normalization of those events. O’Sullivan et al. (2008) stated: “a 
qualitative study describes specific features of each individual, organization, jurisdiction 
or program” (p. 39). Given these descriptive parameters, I selected this method as the 
best explanative lens for my thematic inquiry. O’Sullivan et al. explained that researchers 
often conducted qualitative studies in the field, observing the phenomenon while using 
their experiences and insights to construct a study and interpret their meaning.  
I conducted my content analyses across a sample of four radical lone wolf events 
in NYC between 2010 and 2017. Using each of the four cases individually, I examined 
journalism content within four NYC based news outlets (NY Times, Daily News, NY Post, 
and Wall Street Journal) ranging across a political continuum: left-leaning NY Times, left 
of center Daily News, right of center NY Post, and right-leaning Wall Street Journal. I 
examined the thematic content analyses of the selected lone wolf events using NVivo 
v.12 Plus across the reported stories’ lives. 
Definitions 
This section provides an understanding of the ideas and terminology used 
throughout the study. The selected terminology and concepts include: 
Borum’s fourth stage: According to Borum’s (2012a) four-stage model of the 




begins by framing some unsatisfying event, condition, or grievance (it’s not right) 
as being unjust (it’s not fair). The injustice is blamed on a target policy, person, or 
nation (it’s your fault). The responsible party is then vilified—often demonized— 
(you’re evil), which facilitates justification or impetus for aggression. (p. 39)  
According to Borum, the “you’re evil” phase is the fourth and final stage of the model. 
Counterterrorism: The Defense Technical Information Center and the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (2014) defined counterterrorism as “actions and activities to neutralize 
terrorists, their organizations, and networks; removes countering root causes and desired 
regional end states from the definition” (p. GL-3).  
Lone wolves: Lone wolves are individuals that act alone and independently of a 
group or organization. According to Michael (2012), “although they may agree with a 
group’s ideology, they usually are able to plan and carry out their attacks without any 
assistance from a group or network” (p. 44).  
Political slant: According to Dictionary.com (2019), a slant means “to distort 
(information) by rendering it unfaithfully or incompletely, especially to reflect a 
particular viewpoint.” For example, the reporter’s slanted news story discredited the 
Administration. Therefore, a political slant is a journalistic style of reporting that is 
published and written toward having the news fit the political ideas of the readers. 
Radicalization: Khosrokhavar (2016) posited that radicalization “refers to the 
process by which an individual or group adopts a violent form of action directly linked to 
an extremist ideology with political, social, or religious content that contests the 




Sharia (Sharīʿah): Sharia refers to Islamic or Syariah law. According to Shamsy 
and Coulson (2019) of Encyclopedia Britannica, Sharia is  
the religious law of Islam is seen as the expression of God’s command for 
Muslims and, in application, constitutes a system of duties that are incumbent 
upon all Muslims by virtue of their religious belief. (para. 1) 
Social construction: According to Berger and Luckmann (1966), social 
construction refers to the process of people creating the totality of their socio-cultural and 
psychological environment. 
Soft target: Merriam-Webster.com (2019) defined a soft target as an easily 
attackable target because it does not have military defenses. Examples include hospitals, 
schools, etc.  
Terrorism: According to the Counterterrorism Threat Assessment and Warning 
Unit, National Security Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation (1999), terrorism is 
“the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce 
a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political 
or social objectives” (p. i).  
Assumptions 
An assumption is an aspect of the study assumed to be accurate and not tested in 
the study’s parameters. For example, one part of this study was the belief that radical lone 
wolves are violent. Subsequently, I did not provide extensive details of lone wolf activity, 
how lone wolves assemble explosions, or how they obtained their weapons; instead, those 




occurred. Additionally, I assumed that radical lone wolves are trained to carry out their 
missions and kill. I also assumed that the dates the events were reported were accurate 
and the information was vetted. Therefore, I specifically looked at the lone wolf events 
reported within the parameters of this study. 
Scope and Delimitations 
In this study, I focused on the phenomenon of journalistic reporting on radical 
lone wolf terrorist attacks in the NYC Metropolitan area using four politically varied 
digital news outlets. I selected this specific focus because of the various journalistic 
reports generated at the time of these attacks. In this study, I excluded digital news outlets 
reporting outside the NYC area. I limited my analyses to reporting methods and story life 
across each of the four selected radical lone wolf attacks within NYC between 2010 and 
2017, as reported in four of the city’s most popular news outlets. The NYC District 
Attorney’s Office identified and labled all four cases as terrorism and apprehended all 
perpetrators. 
Limitations 
As a World Trade Center first responder, I have personal views about terrorism. 
However, I addressed these biases by articulating them and following the research 
requirement criteria. Other limitations for this study stemmed from my possible improper 
coding of content, misclassifying themes, and misinterpreting thematic data. Although 
several news agencies report the news throughout NYC, the four chosen news outlets 
were the most popular in the market; however, they may not wholly represent the entire 




studied represented a small size and were limited to NYC alone. I do not know how many 
different reports have been published nationally regarding the same incidents. Other 
sources also published narratives about the same events I selected for this study. 
When I began this study, I was unaware of what I would uncover and the various 
narratives published about the same events. To address the issue of potential narrative 
discrepancies, I used thematic analyses. Braun and Clarke (2006) defined thematic 
analysis as “a method for identifying, analyzing, and reporting patterns (themes) within 
the data” (p. 79). This process helped me address some of the limitations.  
Significance of the Study 
My study helps fill information gaps by providing greater insight into journalistic 
narratives presented to readers regarding radical lone wolf terrorists. Normalizing these 
events is contrary to American society’s construction of reality around lone wolf 
terroristic events. Knowledge in the discipline is advanced by providing further insight 
into the importance of accurate and non-slanted reporting. Through education and 
awareness regarding the influence of news agencies and their journalistic reporting, I 
contributed to these ongoing conversations, creating more vital community awareness, 
training, and preparedness for law enforcement and citizens alike.  
Significance to Social Change 
It is a given that social change begins with local change. By examining the 
patterns and themes of journalistic reporting on these selected radical lone wolf events, I 
provided information that can enhance the societal understanding that the normalization 




enforcement education gaps by providing themes that will be beneficial for police officer 
training and interrogation techniques to improve their risk evaluation of persons of 
interest. Overall, these components can assist in creating enhanced communication with 
communities throughout NYC and forge bonds with law enforcement agencies, which 
can help improve awareness and training. 
Significance to Public Policy 
Logically, public policy shapes law and regulation, which, in turn, impacts law 
enforcement training and other education. My findings bring attention to stakeholders 
about improving how events are reported and communicated through the chain of 
command or supervisory structure. Results can impact how policy is written to enhance 
training and awareness about contingency plans related to lone wolf events. 
Summary 
Four lone wolf terrorist attacks occurred from 2010 to 2017 in NYC: The Times 
Square Bombing on May 1, 2010; the Chelsea bomber on September 17, 2016; the 
Manhattan Bike Path terrorism on October 31, 2017; and the Port Authority bombing on 
December 11, 2017. Literature review revealed a growing problem reflected by the 
number of radical lone wolf attacks occurring in the United States. In this study, I 
explored how journalistic reporting of radical lone wolf events in NYC impacted the 
social construction of reality, remarkably how these stories varied across politically 
diverse news media outlets. I acquired data from four NYC digital news outlets and 
conducted content analyses for themes aligned with politically slanted stories and 




Chapter 1 provided an overview of the research study. The chapter presented an 
explanation of the study’s importance, the ontology of the study, and a summary of the 
research epistemology. Chapter 1 included: (a) the background, (b) problem statement, 
(c) purpose of the study, (d) research question, (e) theoretical framework, (f) nature of the 
study, (g) definitions, (h) scope and delimitations, (i) limitations, (j) significance of the 
study, and (k) summary. Chapter 2, the literature review, includes the search parameters 
and literature review on (a) the proposed study framework, (b) explanation of a lone wolf, 
(c) research review, (d) patterns of behavior, (e) ideology, (f) policy, (g) psychology, (h) 
social construction, (i) communication, (j) social change, and (k) summary. Chapter 3 
presents the research methodology in detail, Chapter 4 the results, and Chapter 5 a 




Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Law enforcement efforts throughout the United States face continual media 
criticism of their lone wolf identification efforts and deterrent actions. However, if 
investigative reports are slanted, enforcement officers cannot recognize and deal with 
self-radicalizing individuals. Furthermore, if journalistic reporting influences a 
normalization of terrorists’ activities, a contrary, social construction of reality occurs. 
Through this research, I investigated these social constructions and journalistic influences 
on the normalization of selected radicalized lone wolf terrorist events. In this literature 
review, I probed literature related to radical lone wolf terrorist actions before, during, and 
after attacks, examining the editorial political slant about lone wolf terrorist acts and the 
individuals who commit them.  
In this literature review, I explored and exposed gaps in current literature about 
how social construction impacts communication and how information is filtered. This 
research furthered scientific understanding by adding context and analysis to radical lone 
wolf terrorist events, thereby providing deeper awareness about radical lone wolf terrorist 
phenomenology. Accordingly, I incorporated a social construction lens of relevant 
literature and journalistic reporting. A social construction lens provided a better 
benchmark of the importance of communication and how it impacted practices and 
policies.  
I centered this literature review on lone wolf attacks and associated news reports. 
I analyzed patterns, trends, ideology, psychology, policy, financing, and social constructs 




scholarly literature, media practices, public policies, and social communication methods 
that did not address the radical lone wolf phenomenon and how journalistic reporting 
affects its societal normalization. Additionally, this literature review included research 
related to the topic, current information, and current issues facing law enforcement in the 
field. My objectives were to identify the literature gaps related to the topic and add to the 
related body of knowledge. Chapter 2, the literature review, includes the search 
parameters and literature review on (a) the proposed study framework, (b) explanation of 
a lone wolf, (c) research review, (d) patterns of behavior, (e) ideology, (f) policy, (g) 
psychology, (h) social construction, (i) communication, (j) social change, and (k) 
summary. 
Literature Search Strategy 
I acquired literature via internet searches using Google, Google Scholar, the 
Homeland Security Digital Library (HSDL), the YouTube database, and the Walden 
University Library databases. Walden Library databases included Academic Search 
Complete, Communications and Mass Media Complete, Criminal Justice Database, CQ 
Researcher, Directory of Open Access Journals, EBSCO Host and Books, Gate Academic 
One File Select, govinfo, HSDL, LexisNexis, Academic Homeland Security Digital 
Library, Military and Government Collections, Political Science Complete, ProQuest 
Central, ProQuest Dissertations and Thesis, SAGE Publications and Journals, Thoreau 
Multi-database Search, and Walden Research Library, among others. Newspaper 
literature searches included the NY Times, NY Post, Wall Street Journal, and NY Daily 




Keywords, phrases, and boolean combinations included terrorism, lone wolf, lone 
attackers, homeland security, domestic terrorism, behavior normalization, terrorist 
behavior, terrorist psychology, terrorism in the United States, political slant, journalist 
reports, NYC Terrorist Attacks, and social construction, which I defined in search 
engines to procure information. The resulting materials consisted of textbooks, peer-
reviewed articles, dissertations, media articles and reviews, and audio/video segments. I 
obtained the audio/video segments by typing in the names of subject matter experts that 
had conducted speaking engagements in past governmental committee core private 
security conferences on the topic into the YouTube database.  
While the focus of my literature review was primarily to find current literature 
(within the last 5 years), due to the event range of this study (2010 to 2017), my literature 
search parameters ranged from 2008 to 2019. Additionally, I performed searches by 
authors to provide further insight into other documents cited in articles and texts related 
to the topic, which frequently resulted in researching literature before 2008. I then 
analyzed and filtered results relative to the research topic. 
Theoretical Framework 
Theoretical frameworks support a study and focus on results interpretation 
(Gabriel, 2008; Swanson & Chermack, 2013). Both Gabriel and Swanson and Chermack 
explained that theoretical frameworks define and support the foundations of a research 
study. Berger and Luckmann’s (1966) social construction theory, in tandem with 
Borum’s (2012a) four-stage pathway mindset model of terrorism, fit well within the 




radicalization. According to Berger and Luckmann, social construction theory frames 
human experiences and environments with social, cultural, and psychological functions to 
form acceptable ways of life. Borum’s pathway model details the steps from pre-
radicalization to radicalization.  
Both frameworks were essential to this research because they provided insight 
leading to further understanding. I also applied them to my result analyses to expand 
societal understanding and recognition of terrorist activity. These insights can assist in 
developing preparedness plans and cooperation throughout communities regarding 
radical lone wolf attackers. Throughout my professional experience as a first responder, I 
witnessed community recognition and preparedness used to aid decision-making 
processes in situations involving police officers daily. Thus, understanding these social 
constructions allowed increased comprehension of why certain behaviors elicit individual 
responses critical to discerning reactions to specific events. 
Borum’s Four-Stage Pathway Mindset Model of Terrorism 
Theoretical foundational information, such as Borum’s (2012a) four-stage model, 
was imperative to understand how components intertwined and played a critical role in 
lone wolf phenomenology. In a four-stage model, Borum outlined the emergence of a 
terrorist mindset. Published in the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Law 
Enforcement bulletin, Borum’s model defined the steps and stages that lead to the 
terrorist radicalization process. Borum described how complaints and weaknesses morph 
into hatred and lead to a justification for violence. Borum’s Stage 1 begins with some 




terrorist mindset through the fundamental idea of unfair practice at the fault of policy or 
government. Borum’s third stage, the Target Stage, encompasses the terrorist’s focus on 
blaming that policy or government for society’s vilification of the terrorist. According to 
Borum, the final stage is the Distancing/Devaluation Stage, wherein the terrorists 
demonize the parties that they believe are responsible for their unjust situation. Borum 
noted that it is in this fourth stage that the terrorist justifies the use of violence. Thus, as 
the terrorist progresses through each stage, the terrorist gets one step closer to 
radicalization. 
Prior Use of Borum’s Model.  
The four-stage pathway mindset model of terrorism has been used in related 
qualitative studies demonstrating strong credibility (Borum & Fein, 2017; Klausen et al., 
2015; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2017). Borum and Fien used the model to analyze and 
discuss the psychology of foreign fighters going into Syria. Borum and Fein dissected the 
motivations behind the violent conflict in Syria, and they delved into the recruitment 
strategies used in the transnational insurgency. While Borum and Fein demonstrated the 
pathways toward radicalization and armed conflict, Klausen et al. used Borum’s (2012a) 
model of radicalization to frame violent extremism as an enactment of a role scripted by 
others but openly interpreted and varied by the actors. Klausen et al. analyzed 68 cases 
and conducted over 272 observations aligning the radicalization process to demonstrated 
behaviors. McCauley and Moskalenko provided an overview of political radicalization in 
conjunction with a two pyramids model, creating an understanding of the relationship 




posited that radicalization is “the process of developing extremist ideologies and beliefs 
needs to be distinguished from action pathways the process of engaging in terrorism or 
violent extremist actions” (p. 19). McCauley and Moskalenko analyzed two types of lone 
wolf terrorists: disconnected/disordered and caring/compelling. According to McCauley 
and Moskalenko, Kaczynski was disconnect/disordered because of mental issues, 
depression, and loneliness. Conversely, caring/compelling lone wolves, like Clayton 
Wagner, were socially connected and demonstrated sympathy for unjustly treated people, 
thus driving them toward a moral duty to carry out justice. 
How Borum’s Model Relates to This Study 
The four-stage model paths how hatred develops and can lead to violence 
(Borum, 2012a). Borum’s pathway model aids comprehension of the behavioral 
progression that leads to radicalization. Although Borum originally developed the model 
for law enforcement training, the framework provided details about the steps that lead to 
aggression. Borum’s model also contextually provided relevance to the study by 
indicating how to recognize the radicalization process. Borum’s model defines the 
fundamental principles behind radicalization and assists in identifying why lone wolves 
behave the way they do. Since the purpose of my study was to qualitatively identify and 
analyze how social construction in journalistic reporting may be normalizing radical lone 
wolf terrorism, Borum’s model provided a sound theoretical focusing tool. 
Berger and Luckmann’s Social Construction Theory 
The premise of Berger and Luckmann’s (1966) social construction theory was 




Luckmann believed that people’s ideas about reality centered on social norms and values, 
eventually becoming part of society, thereby demonstrating social construction. Society 
creates opinions about certain people and things every day (Berger & Luckmann, 1966); 
thus, social construction is a way of grouping and identifying. One example of social 
construction included characteristics used to describe men and women’s societal 
expectations. According to a Reference (2020) staff writer, society defines male and 
female characteristics, shaping behavior from birth in an iterative fashion. Thus, social 
constructs and norms are developed and promoted throughout society to create 
normalization throughout society. Social construction theory has been used abundantly to 
frame, analyze, and support social science research.  
Prior Use of Social Construction Theory 
Gaines and Kappeler (2012) posited that society was regularly exposed to the 
term “terrorism” by the media, politicians, and entertainment venues. Gaines and 
Kappeler noted how terrorism applied to various actors, conditions, activities, and 
situations. The label terrorism demonizes people, societies, and actions (Gaines & 
Kappeler, 2012). Gaines and Kappeler discussed how perspectives change through time 
and how labeling an act or a person as a terrorist has a partisan dimension. Gaines and 
Kappeler exampled how Israeli labeled Palestinian suicide bombers as terrorists, whereas 
Palestinians viewed their behavior as just defiance or retribution. Thus, these two 
different labels for the same actions help identify how components group social behavior 
and actions. Dowling (1989) noted that terrorists occasionally seem conscious of their 




of Israel (1913-1992)] writings about Irgun victimization to remove the negative labels 
and allow rebirth. Dowling also referenced the prideful manner in which enemies and 
opponents try to belittle others through humiliation and degradation. Dowling’s exhibit 
characterized an existing system of social order that helped me further understand the 
way social construction operated within a terrorist society. 
How Social Construction Theory Relates to This Study 
Social construction connected the normalization practices from journalistic 
reporting to the community considering lone wolf terroristic events. Berger and 
Luckmann’s (1966) social construction theory articulated how society creates 
normalization practices through social construction. This study analyzed how politically 
slanted journalistic reporting impacted how society viewed lone wolf terrorist events; 
thus, social construction theory provided a solid framework for building those analyses. 
Review of the Current Literature 
This literature review identified themes related to the lone wolf phenomenon, 
including how ideology, radicalization, policy, financing, social construction, 
communication, and the internet play an integral role in radical lone wolf behavior. The 
information I attained indicated that signs and behaviors identify lone wolf terrorist 
attacker development, which aligned with stage four of Borum’s (2012a) model. The 
literature, however, also highlighted the challenges and barriers that law enforcement 
agencies consistently face against radical lone wolves who continually circumvent law 
enforcement and legal system efforts at identification and deterrence. Although some law 




communication lines allowing the free flow of information between local communities 
and law enforcement agencies. Applying Berger and Luckmann’s (1966) theory of social 
construction, when lone wolf terrorist activity normalization occurred, normalization 
inhibited communication flow between society and enforcement officials. The statistics 
and findings discussed in this literature review indicated that radical lone wolf terrorists 
were problematic and posed a challenge for society; therefore, the literature review 
validated the necessity for increased research about the radical lone wolf terrorist 
phenomenon. The literature review provided further context about radicalization, issues 
regarding communication, and how communication affects preparedness for extreme lone 
wolf events. 
Definition of Lone Wolf 
The term lone wolf is not new. Spaaij (2010) traced the term as far back as the 
nineteenth century, demonstrating the term’s connection with anarchism. Applying 
Berger and Luckman’s (1966) social construction theory, the societal connection of the 
term “lone wolf” to the broader category of anarchy was the beginning of the societal 
normalization of the lone wolf. Based on Spaaij’s findings, the term leaderless resistance 
evolved as a term used by the White supremacist known as Louis Beam. Spaaij used a 
normalizing pattern linking the term “leaderless resistance.” According to the Seditionist 
(1992), Beam was a White supremacist and Grand Dragon of the Klu Klux Klan (KKK) 
who perpetrated the leaderless resistance theory from a concept of Colonel Ulius Louis 
Amoss. Amoss was an intelligence officer and founder of the International Service of 




origination of the term ‘leaderless resistance’ to Amoss in 1962 and the 1983 
proliferation of the leaderless resistance social theory to Beam. Per the Seditionist, Beam 
avidly promoted a leaderless resistance approach as an effective attack strategy to further 
the cause of an organization. Thus, the normalization of a leaderless resistance dated to 
1962. 
Beam believed that a leaderless resistance strategy could counter law enforcement 
and U.S. militias (Spaaij, 2010). Beam’s idea was independent action without reporting to 
a group (Seditionist, 1992; Spaaij, 2010). Thus, Beam promoted the normalization of a 
leaderless rebellion by employing social construction. Spaaij also reported that the term 
“lone wolf” was likely emphasized in the 1990s by two known White Supremacists, Tom 
Metzger, KKK Grand Wizard, and founder of the White Aryan Resistance; (WAR); and 
Alex Curtis, founder of the National Observer newsletter. Organizations like ISII, KKK, 
WAR, and the National Observer further perpetuated the normalization of leaderless 
rebellion and lone wolf identities through their societal construction aspects (Spaaij, 
2010). Spaaij noted Metzger and Curtis’ strategy that lone wolf and small cell approaches 
were more challenging to detect due to their normal appearance and incorporated more 
successful tactics to carry out their objectives. 
This type of approach, a lone wolf approach, was a tactic that permitted and 
inspired individuals, or small groups, to convey acts of violence or sabotage free of any 
leadership or group support (Joose, 2017). The point at which the terrorist plans and 
perpetrates associates with stage four of Borum’s (2012a) model. According to Joose, 




lone attacks to signify desperation and failure. These struggling, outcast individuals fell 
within Borum’s third stage and, if no intervention occurred, advanced to the fourth stage, 
wherein they planned and carried out their terroristic behaviors. Thus, the lone wolf may 
possess an ideological mindset or shared belief, like a terrorist group, but operates 
independently of that group and reports to no one. 
The findings of Joose (2017) and Spaaij (2010) provided a historical pretext about 
the background and definition of a lone wolf wherein both Berger and Luckmann’s 
(1966) social construction and Borum’s (2012a) four-stage model helped explain the lone 
wolf evolution. Both Joose and Spaaij conducted a qualitative case study analysis of the 
lone wolf phenomenon. Joose examined cases of lone wolf terrorists that operated 
independently but were still part of a common cause to minimize industrial capital 
groups' impact on society. Joose and Spaaij presented a basic definition of a lone wolf 
terrorist. Those definitions were critical to this study because, without understanding 
what a lone wolf was, it is challenging to create effective strategies addressing lone wolf 
actions. Additionally, to carry out this research study, a concise definition provided a 
clear perspective of the research problem, purpose, and study nature. 
Lone Wolves 
Identifying the steps that lead to radicalization and radical lone wolf behavior help 
understand the terrorist mindset (Borum, 2012a). Borum developed the four-stage 
pathway mindset model of terrorism, outlining each stage's behaviors leading up to stage 
four, the distance/devaluation stage. According to Borum, during the 




individual in the case of lone wolfs, and these stereotypes are applied and socialized to 
and about these outgroup members” (p. 604). Understanding how the normalization of 
lone wolf terrorist activities aligned with social construction theory tenants was essential 
to analyzing potential journalistic reporting leading to that normalization. Although the 
primary purpose of this study was to explore how journalistic reporting may have played 
a part in the social construction and the normalization of terrorist activities, foundational 
understandings of lone wolves were essential to data analysis. 
Types of Terrorists 
There are four distinctive terrorist types in the United States, each with a unique 
behavior pattern (Smith, 2008). Smith classified terrorist groups into four types: “left-
wing, right-wing, single issue, and international” (p. 3). Thus, a lone wolf terrorist falls 
within the “single-issue” category. Terrorist groups demonstrate stark behavior 
differences from lone wolf terrorists (Smith, 2008), which means their social construction 
follows a different path; however, all terrorist types evolved through social constructs and 
fit within Borum’s (2012a) four-stage model. Smith claimed that terrorists pondered from 
a universal perspective but acted from a local perspective that spoke to their social 
construction. Smith established that, among single-issue terrorist groups, 71% of their 
pre-attack actions transpired within 12 miles of their residence, and 92% occurred within 
28 miles of their intended mark. Contrarily, Smith et al. (2014) analyzed the geospatial 
patterns of lone wolf terrorist attacks throughout the United States and found that lone-
actor terrorists were willing to travel long distances from where they live to commit lone 




distances from where they engage in precursor preparation activities than terrorist group 
participants. A median distance of 170 miles to 79 miles, respectively is traveled” (p. 2). 
Regardless of the distance traveled to perpetrate their terrorist acts, according to Borum, 
the terrorist mindset began with the grievance stage wherein the individual criticized their 
social condition and environment. 
Alarmingly, Smith (2008) noted data collection from sources with a high 
propensity towards inadept violent practices such as environmental/anti-abortion 
extremists that regularly colluded in targeting lone wolves that agreed with their cause. 
Therefore, Smith’s sample may have involved differing participant types separated by 
their stage within Borum’s (2012a) four-stage model, but terrorists, nonetheless. On the 
other hand, Smith et al. (2014) analyzed ‘‘476 inductees charged with more than 3,000 
federal criminal charges” (p. 1), effectively isolating fourth-stage lone wolf terrorists. 
Understanding the distance that lone wolves (in contrast to other terrorists) are willing to 
travel provides increased support enforcement effectiveness by comprehending their 
social construction differences. This information was relevant to my study to analyze 
whether journalistic reporting took those distances into account, and any applicable, 
resulting normalization was subsequently socially constructed. 
Terrorist Attacks Conducted by Lone Wolves 
In a research brief that the National Consortium published for the Study of 
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), Smith et al. (2014) reported that “264 
terrorist incidents were researched from 1980 - present” (p. 1). According to Smith et al., 




actors” (p. 1), which equated to a 25% ratio. These statistics indicated that lone wolf 
actors were responsible for approximately ¼ of all terrorist attacks. Smith et al. reported 
that individuals charged with terrorism “were responsible for 1,788 recorded precursor 
activities that occurred at over 1,100 geo-coded addresses” (p. 1). The demographics of 
Smith et al.’s study spanned the United States and provided statistics about gender, age, 
marital status, and education. Smith et al. indicated that 27% of lone-actor terrorists were 
female, and the average age of perpetrators was 34 years. Most lone actor terrorists 
discussed in Smith et al.’s brief were educated, with 89% having completed some college 
and 19% married. These statistics provided data about lone wolf terrorist event behavior 
and the way they selected attack targets. Statistical analysis revealed patterns of behavior 
and actions taken by lone wolves. Relating research with Borum’s (2012a) model 
indicated the stage of the lone wolf behavior and how it connected to lone wolf activity 
and attacks. Understanding how news outlets reported these events and how their lone 
wolf normalization impacted society indicated how social construction occurred. 
Understanding Lone Wolf Concepts 
These statistics were meaningful because, when combined with Borum’s (2012a) 
model, the demographic statistics helped gauge how lone wolves plot their attacks. Smith 
et al. (2014) provided a perspective about the precursor activities before lone wolf attacks 
and furnished an opinion about the extent that lone wolf terrorists were willing to 
undertake to commit their attacks. Subsequently, Borum categorized precursor activities 
into various stages of the model. Borum emphasized that those activities aid in 




social construct. Additionally, Smith et al. demonstrated that lone wolves were more 
clandestine than terror cell network groups, which indicated that societal normalization of 
their activities prevented preemptive identification.  
This obfuscation made lone wolves more difficult to track and apprehend; 
however, if identification occurred in a dehumanizing manner, then such maligning 
actions pushed the would-be terrorist into Borum’s (2012a) third or fourth stage, causing 
accelerated terrorism. While Smith (2008) provided clear information about the study, 
Smith did not discuss a theory, hypothesis, or the data retrieval environment. In contrast, 
Smith et al. (2014) offered a description through their statistical analysis about the types 
of behaviors indicative of lone wolves. Smith et al.’s statistical reflection provided a 
fundamental idea about what lone wolf terrorists undertook to execute their plots and 
what precursors needed to be analyzed to minimize lone wolf capabilities. Associating 
these studies with Berger and Luckmann’s (1966) theory of social construction and 
Borum’s four-stage model allowed increased identification of lone wolf behavior 
patterns. 
Lone Wolf Behavior Patterns 
While Meloy (2016) and Hoffman (2012) did not employ Borum’s (2012a) 
model, I dissected their findings using Borum’s model. Meloy stated that the substantial 
behavioral signs exhibited by individual terrorists included “pathways, fixation, 
identification, novel aggression, energy burst, leakage, last resort, directly communicated 
threat, and investigative usefulness” (p. 3). Pathways and fixation equated to the first 




stage of Borum’s model. However, energy burst, leakage, and investigative usefulness 
aligned to Borum’s third stage, whereas last resorts and directly communicated threats 
were Borum’s fourth stage. Hoffman reported that terrorists committed crimes and then 
retreated to their suburban sanctuaries and eluded law enforcement without capture. 
Thus, the perpetrators in Hoffman’s study used the normalizing component of Berger and 
Luckmann’s (1966) social construction theory to escape detection. According to 
Hoffman, most terrorist acts were well planned, well-financed, and well detailed, 
indicating that the terrorists planned to normalize social constructs like the Seditionist 
(1992) reported in Beam's leaderless resistance theory. Former U.S. Secretary of Defense 
Gaffney (2012) claimed that the environment that terrorist networks established was 
more tolerant of their behavior despite the violence and mayhem attached to it, which 
indicated a normalizing element. Two examples included the Olympic Bomber, Eric 
Rudolph, and the Unabomber, Ted Kaczynski. These reports inferred socially constructed 
social acceptance for specific practices normalized the radical lone wolf terrorist threat. 
Recently, Meloy (2016) identified some critical identifiers for flagging and 
monitoring threat management; specific policy measures or training remained 
undescribed. However, Meloy also failed to note the dissemination of these patterns or 
how their training injection improved awareness and preparedness. In comparison, 
Hoffman (2012) emphasized the need for enforcement agencies to create a horizontal 
relationship between local law enforcement agencies and have a vertical relationship 
between Federal, State, and Local agencies. For example, Poole (2010a, 2010b, 2012) 




national counterterrorism center in Washington, D.C. after the U.S. Department of Justice 
had deemed Mustafah a Hammas Operative. This revelation illustrated an apparent 
disconnect between U.S. federal agencies and the dilemmas that needed to be addressed 
within these agencies when dealing with counterterrorism strategies. This example also 
indicated that a communication problem existed, and a normalizing social construction 
took place. Hoffman admonished that the lack of communication between law 
enforcement agencies is what obstructed the capture of terrorists, noting that immediate 
apprehension after committing the crime minimizes a terrorists’ ability to evade capture 
and prosecution. Such a lack, or slant, in communicative reporting indicated what Berger 
and Luckmann (1966) referred to as social construction because it dis- or mis-associated 
communication; thereby, building a new social construct different from the society that 
existed. These accountings indicated a shift in society’s social paradigm and within the 
social construct of the U.S. government that was normalizing terrorist behavior. 
Terrorists Within the U.S. Government 
Connecting underlying constructs and Berger and Luckmann’s (1966) social 
construction theory helps identify the normalizing terrorist behavior within any social 
entity. While Gaffney (2012) also promoted the necessity of making connections, 
Gaffney also offered a position that terrorist organizations deeply embedded within the 
U.S. government produced an environment permissive of terrorist ideology and lone wolf 
terrorist behavior. Gaffney noted several U.S. governmental operatives with ties to 
terrorist networks and attributed a degree of law enforcements’ inability to identify, 




social construct and hinders the ability to recognize terrorists in all but the fourth stage of 
Borum’s (2012a) model. For example, Poole (2012) reported that Anwar Al Wilaki (a 
known ISIS terrorist; Sperry, 2005) trained most Muslim Chaplains assigned to the 
Pentagon. Such infiltration exposed military personnel to harm and created access for 
terrorists to attempt military radicalization and normalize their behavior. While neither 
Gaffney nor Poole shared their sources, both conveyed that the situation creates a 
breeding ground for lone wolf radical behavior; however, the normalizing social 
construct continues. Gaffney’s and Poole’s reports indicated that then-current anti-
terrorism strategies failed within the government. Subsequently, communication 
breakdown led to increased lone wolf behavior as the social construction within the U.S. 
government normalized such behavior. 
According to testimony given during the Terrorist Diaspora hearing before the 
Task Force on Denying Terrorists Entry to the United States, Committee of Homeland 
Security House of Representatives, 115 Cong. 1 (2017), Al-Qaeda remained an active 
terrorist organization. However, social construct normalization obfuscated that 
information from enforcement officials that needed it and the society that fell victim to it. 
Clarke testified that operational fighters tried to resuscitate dormant networks, create new 
cells, recruit members, and instigate lone wolf attacks (Terrorist Diaspora, 2017). 
Clarke’s testimony indicated that terrorists at all four stages of Borum’s (2012a) model 
were in play; however, normalization related to communication obfuscating all but the 
fourth stage wherein preemptive action was impossible. Additionally, Clarke reported 




enforcement by syncing enforcement personnel at the local level with the national level 
entities (Terrorist Diaspora, 2017). Such communication links would decrease terrorist 
normalization by allowing law enforcement social constructs to build from reality rather 
than misinformation. Clarke’s recommendations aligned strongly with Hoffman’s (2012) 
and Poole’s (2012) recommendations for the same. According to Clarke, a growing 
number of jihadis have a criminal history and are better known to local beat cops than 
higher-level enforcement officers, so connecting these two components from the bottom 
up is critical (Terrorist Diaspora, 2017). While Clarke provided suggestions and 
responses to create a fundamental strategy, the statements provided by other witnesses 
suggested a more significant problem with normalized terrorist behavior.  
Joscelyn testified that, as recently as 2015, support enforcement thwarted a plot in 
the state of Ohio involving a Syrian that returned to the United States to launch a terrorist 
attack (Terrorist Diaspora, 2017). Wilcox testified that families had relocated to Syria to 
be a part of the caliphate and that there were children born to U.S. parents (Terrorist 
Diaspora, 2017). According to Wilcox, the children would have ISIS’s ideology and 
indoctrination. Wilcox shared that a good portion of these children had a nexus to France 
and that the United Kingdom had forwarded alerts that it was probable that ISIS may 
exercise these minors to become terrorists. In all these instances, social construction was 
normalizing terrorist behavior through family networks and connections. Case in point: In 
2016, children in seven different countries throughout the West conducted 34 ISIS 
attacks (The Terrorist Diaspora, 2017). The Terrorist Diaspora hearing highlighted the 




once they have returned from overseas; however, information from that hearing generally 
went unpublicized. Thus, communication obfuscation continues to normalize terrorist 
behavior.  
During the Persistent Threat hearing, before the Subcommittee on 
Counterterrorism and Intelligence, Committee on Homeland Security (CHS) House of 
Representatives, Cafarella stated that America continued having problems understanding 
the enemy (The Persistent Threat, 2017). Cafarella reported negligence to comprehend 
the essence of the terrorist enemy and that the United States would continue to fail unless 
they addressed the grievances that the enemy posed (The Persistent Threat, 2017). Not 
only did this expose the normalizing social construction of the nation, but it also 
indicated the need to apply theories like Borum’s (2012a) four-stage model to aid 
terrorist understanding. For instance, in Borum’s stage three, the terrorist is dehumanized 
and maligned by society, which pushes the terrorist into stage four. With a better 
understanding of the terrorist mindset, increased counterterrorism would result. U.S. 
Representative Jackson-Lee added that any associated policy creation must be proceeded 
by understanding that several terrorist groups were fluid and using cyberspace to 
radicalize and weaponize (The Persistent Threat, 2017). Considering testimony given 
during the Terrorist Diaspora (2017) hearing, in conjunction with Gaffney’s (2012) and 
Poole’s (2012) findings, the statements given during the Persistent Threat hearing 
warranted a multi-layered approach using social construction as the cornerstone. 
Until the government and law enforcement can better realize the lone wolf enemy, 




information would be equally helpful to the populace to assist with safety plans and 
measures; however, there is no standard method for transmitting that information to the 
public from a politically neutral perspective. Berger and Luckmann (1966) posited that 
individuals construct their societies from experiences and encounters. Therefore, these 
constructs build from the encounters and experiencing, reading, or listening to 
journalistic reporting. Subsequently, since journalistic reporting is typically slanted along 
a political line and frequently omits data or applies opinionated viewpoints, the 
worldviews of those media build and normalize their reader’s social constructs 
preventing many individuals from recognizing lone wolf behavior or ideology. 
Lone Wolf Ideology 
Understanding lone wolf ideology was critical to recognizing lone wolf activities, 
especially since, according to Simon (2013), approximately two-thirds of home-grown 
attacks in the United States proceeding 9/11 came from single individuals. Simon posited 
that lone wolf communication and radicalization contributed to developing the 
ideological mindset that led to lone wolf behavior. Simon’s findings supplemented and 
aligned with the methodology for radicalization and communication between terrorist 
networks reported by congressional hearings (A Ticking Time Bomb, 2011), lone wolf 
terrorists (Kaczynski, 2009), and scholars (Bergen, 2017; Heymann, 2000; Sorensen, 
2016; Stakelbeck, 2015), among others. Simon demonstrated that the lone wolf 
phenomenon was problematic for law enforcement as well as society. In an interview 
with CNN Wire Staff, President Obama (2011) reported that “the greatest threat at the 




2011). Simon demonstrated how lone wolf ideological beliefs could add insight into 
situational awareness and help address related questions and undermine typical 
stereotypes.  
Many terrorist satirists portray lone wolf terrorists as religious zealots; however, 
Kaczynski (2009) presented an example deviating from that notion. Convicted lone wolf 
terrorist, Kaczynski, discussed ideological beliefs that inferred behavioral justification 
associated with lone wolf ideological mindsets; thus, aligning with stage two of Borum’s 
(2012a) model. Kaczynski also substantiated that lone wolf ideologies were not solely 
religious-based as Kaczynski’s ideologies stemmed from opposition to industrialization. 
According to Kaczynski, there was a striking similarity between the ideological-based 
driven violence performed by the religiously driven lone wolf terrorists and those 
opposed to industrialization and globalization. For example, terrorist David Headley was 
a Salafist Muslim that held strong opinions about the purity of Islam and held a resulting 
deep hatred for India (Sorensen, 2016). According to Sorensen, Headley believed that “in 
the time of the prophet Mohammed, nothing should be added, nothing removed” (p. 108). 
Sorensen highlighted the religious conflict that Headley faced throughout life; thus, 
associating Headley’s life from stage one through stage four of Borum’s model. 
Headley’s example also highlighted the passionate yet vulnerable nature of youthful 
ideologies that influence their social constructions. 
Many terrorist groups began by appealing to the younger generations and 
attempted to disseminate their ideologies from the early stages of life to cultivate the 




Stakelbeck, 2015). Stakelbeck indicated younger U.S. recruits increasingly identified 
with the ISIS propaganda, radicalized, and traveled overseas to advance the ISIS cause. 
Bergen posited that Americans with ties to Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda frequently traveled 
to Somalia to further the networks’ cause, albeit Bergen also reported ample terrorist 
support throughout the United States. According to Bergen, the terror group Al-Shabaab 
had ties to Al-Qaeda, and supporters were prolific in cities like Seattle, St. Louis, San 
Diego, and the states of Minnesota, Maryland, and Ohio. Bergen’s reports of terrorist 
support within the United States aligned with Simon’s insistence that only a handful of 
individuals interacted with Al Qaeda overseas. Albeit, Sorenson (2016) pointed out the 
ease with which Headley traveled and conducted covert, clandestine recon for cell 
networks utilizing various mediums for communication. On the other hand, Vadum 
(2017) posited that Al Qaeda, Hamas, and the Muslim Brotherhood traveled freely and 
independently throughout America and abroad, promoting terrorist propaganda, 
recruiting, and moving people across borders. Simon posited that influential supporters 
typically gained instruction abroad and then traveled back to the United States to deploy 
terrorist attacks. In line with that inference, Simon demonstrated that many lone wolf 
terrorists became inspired by Al Qaeda webpages and online interaction with Al Qaeda 
handlers/representatives rather than in-person communication. Thus, the internet 
connection became a critical component driving lone wolf ideologies. 
Internet Connection 
A significant connection between the internet and Al Qaeda terrorist networks' 




anonymously (Simon, 2013). Headley used the internet avidly and moved freely 
throughout the United States and Europe (Sorensen, 2016). The Boston Marathon 
Bomber, Tsarnaev, used the internet to post jihadist propaganda videos (CHS, 2014); 
Thompson self-radicalized via the internet, thereby supporting Stakelbeck’s (2015) 
insistence that the internet was the “primary medium [that ISIS used] to get kids hooked” 
(p. 5) and radicalized. 
According to CHS (2014), ideological transformation to lone wolf occurred 
within three months on the internet. Zale Thompson was one example of internet 
radicalization. Per CHS, on October 11, 2014, the FBI issued a warning that ISIS 
supporters could target law enforcement personnel. Twelve days later, thirty-two-year-
old Zale Thompson, a Muslim convert, critically wounded four rookie NYC Police 
Officers on a Queens Street in broad daylight with a hatchet (Esposito & Dienst, 2014). 
CHS reported that Thompson’s Facebook page featured radical Islamic imagery aiding 
NYPD’s determination that Thompson’s explosion was an act of terrorism and that 
Thompson was “self-radicalized” via the internet (p. 75). CHS demonstrated that an 
individual could get in touch with leaders of terrorist organizations and auto radicalize at 
night via the internet. Thus, the internet played a crucial role in Thompson’s social 
construction. Stakelbeck reported Twitter as the primary vehicle that ISIS used to 
communicate to English-speaking Americans through propaganda-based videos 
promoting values like a Hollywood movie revolutionizing jihadi media to plead their 




conducive to lone wolf ideologies throughout any of the four stages of Borum’s (2012a) 
model. Furthermore, the internet provided a perfect medium for leaderless resistance. 
Leaderless Resistance 
There was a direct correlation between the internet and the strategies used to 
promote the leaderless resistance mindset advocating violence and motivating lone wolf 
terrorists to carry out attack plots (Stakelbeck, 2015). According to Simon (2013), a 
coordinated, organized system assisted with training, preparing terrorist objectives, and 
promoting a leaderless resistance. Such a system aligned with Berger and Luckmann’s 
(1966) social construction theory in that the leaderless resistance depended on social 
construction to disseminate their ideologies. The terrorist and scholar Marc Sageman 
called this movement a leaderless Jihad (Simon, 2013). Thus, as a leaderless Jihad, a lone 
wolf acted alone, carrying out their terror plot without direction from a terrorist 
organization. Kaczynski (2009) stated, before the last struggle (indicative of Borum’s 
[2012a] fourth stage), revolutionaries should not anticipate an excess of people to support 
them. Simon asserted that an individual with little support from others could significantly 
impact a political, social, religious, or financial event impacting a government or 
community. 
History evolves from active, dedicated minority groups, not majorities, which 
rarely have clear and consistent ideas (Kaczynski, 2009). Albeit, Kaczynski alluded to a 
nexus indicating the internet as a form of communication used by lone wolves to relay 
their ideas about their personal ideological views and opinions, which also aligned with 




Kaczynski, this knowledge demonstrated that lone wolves want their ideas and messages 
communicated to the populace and associated impacts imposed through fear or 
disruption, resulting in a government reacting by heightened security. Thus, terrorists’ 
rhetoric and ideological opinions were valuable to their way of life. That type of 
terrorism was indicative of Borum’s (2012a) pathway, particularly the third and fourth 
stages. This understanding demonstrated the correlation between the form of 
communication (social construction) that terrorist organizations embrace to recruit lone 
wolf jihadists (Borum’s pathway): a leaderless resistance.  
In my experience, while internet communication is elusive, literature confirmed 
the ability to identify similarities and isolate and track internet exchanges, mainly when 
aggressively pursuing mutual communication. However, if normalization occurred within 
the associated social constructions, pertinent information could appear routine or non-
critical and not shared as needed. For example, Bergen (2017) referenced the 
commonalities that Omar Mateen, the Orlando Massacre shooter, had in common with 
Major Nadal Hassan, the Fort Hood attacker; and Sorensen (2016) connected Headley 
and Hassan. The commonalities in all three lone wolf terrorists included the leaderless 
resistance concept, the self-radicalization process, and the internet. Russian counterparts 
also provided intelligence suggesting that Tsarnaev had been to Dagestan, demonstrating 
a connection to Chechen terrorists (CHS, 2014). However, according to CHS, border 
enforcement and intelligence communities did not connect the dots due to normalized 
social constructions; therefore, associated enforcement personnel also did not make the 




radical views (indicative of Borum’s [2012a] third and fourth stages) before the 2009 
Fort Hood attack (the fourth stage finale; A Ticking Time Bomb, 2011). However, DoD 
failed to properly discharge Hassan from service (A Ticking Time Bomb, 2011). 
Additionally, the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) had information that 
Hassan was communicating with Anwar Al Wilahi (a known terrorist) and failed to 
report it to DoD and the military chain of command (normalized social construction; A 
Ticking Time Bomb, 2011). Sorensen (2016) said that Headley contacted a terrorist 
network looking to assassinate the CEO of Lockheed Martin and destroy the company 
because they produced drones for the United States. Bergen (2017) revealed that 
Mateen’s ties to ISIS were primarily aspirational because Mateen was not ordered or paid 
by any organization. Bergen also noted that Mateen acted like other jihadists operating in 
the United States by acting as a self-radicalized lone wolf. Thus, both social construction 
theory and Borum’s (2012a) pathway model shed light that could have aided in 
apprehending those lone wolf terrorists before their criminal attacks. 
Criminology 
This growing existential threat was challenging because lone wolves often do not 
have a criminal history and do not act in concert with others (Simon, 2013). Bergen 
(2017) claimed that Hassan, Tsarnaev, Bledsoe, and Mateen were all on the FBI’s radar, 
but none had any criminal record. Thus, evidence that lone wolves lived silently within 
society due to the normalization of their non-criminal activities. Kaczynski (2009) wrote 
that societies’ problems were intractable due to the failure of the government to stop 




domestic abuse. This ideal intertwines Berger and Luckmann’s (1966) social construction 
theory with Borum’s (2012a) terrorist pathway model in that society could function due 
to dysfunctional government power; thus, the individuals within society acted (Borum’s 
fourth stage). Kaczynski posited that “it is clear that the human race at best has limited 
capacity for solving even relatively straightforward social problems” (p. 52). Simon 
indicated that law enforcement throughout the United States continued to face radical 
lone wolf terrorist issues compounded by the lack of a criminal record related to the 
terrorists. According to Sorensen (2016), while Headley did serve time in prison, Headley 
acted as a U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) informant before the arrest, provided 
information leading to arrests, and intelligence information about numerous other plots. 
Aaronson (2015) also reported a case wherein both the terrorist and the informant had a 
criminal history. The informant had a heroic self-concept for helping capture and thwart a 
terrorist attack on a military facility but was instead considered a criminal (Aaronson, 
2015); which, aligned with Borum’s first and second stages, indicating the continued 
terrorist mindset. Even with those two reports of criminal records, most lone wolf 
terrorists lacked such criminal identifiers. Thus, it was not only their lack of criminal 
record that inhibited the identification of lone wolf terrorists but also their disassociation 
with any specific location. 
Location 
According to Simon (2013), “they [lone wolf terrorists] have no physical 
headquarters or sanctuary, but the tolerant virtual environment of the internet offers them 




leaderless resistance jihad” (p. 35). Thus, their social construction was not bound to a 
single location. For example, Stakelbeck (2015) demonstrated that ISIS’s ability to 
influence terrorist mindsets was equally effective within Somali communities and in 
areas such as Oklahoma, NYC, and within radical young Muslims in the United States 
through social media. Contrarily, third and fourth stage behavior could be recognizable 
within a community (Borum, 2012a) should those within the social construct of that 
community be attentive to such deviation rather than normalization. Tsarnaev presented a 
prime example of a social community recognizing third and fourth stage behavior. 
According to CHS (2014), Tsarnaev became a threat to the Muslim community, and the 
community Mosque reported confrontational situations between Tsarnaev and others 
about Muslim beliefs. Had enforcement authorities been able to act on those reports, they 
may have averted the bombings. Unusual financial activity may also signal lone wolf 
terrorists. 
Financing 
Terrorist leaders of groups such as Al Qaeda, Hamas, and the Muslim 
Brotherhood pooled finances and moved funds across borders quickly due to the 
American legal system (Vadum, 2017). However, according to Simon (2013), lone wolf 
terrorists were self-financed and -organized (Simon, 2013). Simon posited that 
independence prevented connecting the lone wolf to a larger organization. However, it 
could alert a community if the citizens did not view the lone wolf’s actions normal within 
that community (Berger and Luckmann’s [1966] social construction theory). In many 




demonstrated that Cedar-Riverside, Minnesota provided the most significant source of 
assistance for Al-Shabaab, specifically the impoverished community known as “Little 
Mogadishu” (p. 175). The median annual income in Little Mogadishu averaged about 
$15,000 (Bergen, 2017). Bergen also posited that Al-Shabaab might appeal to the 
younger population because association with Al-Shabaab may be better than working a 
job that does not pay well, which fits into Borum’s (2012a) model. The notion of societal 
injustice plays to varying degrees throughout the stages of Borum’s model, up to, and 
including, the violent end justifying the means. 
The Ends Justify the Means 
Lone wolves often use their ideology to justify their behavior, which the larger 
terrorist group with which the lone wolf identifies views as too extreme (Simon, 2013). 
According to Simon, the sole explanation terrorists embrace throughout history has been 
that the result justifies the means. Therefore, should casualties occur, the cost is 
acceptable to further the terrorists’ cause. According to Kaczynski (2009), the idea that 
the ends justify the means implies a nexus between ideological beliefs and violence in the 
mind of terrorists. Kaczynski demonstrated a strong sentiment towards opposition to the 
evolution of society toward industrialization. Alternatively, many terrorists need to justify 
their hatred of anyone that does not believe the way they do (Bergen, 2017; Sorensen, 
2016). According to Sorensen, Headley justified the Israelis’ beheadings conducted by 
ISIS and Al Qaeda relative to the hatred of Israel. Sorensen reported that Headley felt “no 




the same” (p. 172). Thus, Borum’s (2012a) fourth stage was evident in the final actions of 
such terrorists. 
Furthermore, Sorensen (2016) demonstrated that Al Qaeda relied on how Western 
media reported their terrorist activity and analyzed their violent attacks, which inferred a 
strategic manipulation of social construction. Sorensen posited that Al Qaeda believed 
Americans were weak and intolerant of long periods of violence. Thus, by continually 
conducting beheadings and burning bodies, Al-Qaeda believed Americans would back 
down. Following Berger and Luckman’s (1966) theory of social construction and 
Borum’s (2012a) four-stage pathway mindset model of terrorism, terrorists have socially 
constructed reality through media reports for an exceptionally long time. It was also 
apparent that public policy on terrorism remained insufficient. 
Public Policy on Terrorism 
Even when credible proof was available that radicalization occurred involving a 
U.S. citizen, the U.S. Constitution limited how the government could respond (A Ticking 
Time Bomb, 2011). Heymann (2000) discussed several laws relevant to apprehension and 
surveillance of terrorists operating overseas, which could minimize how law enforcement 
operates abroad. However, there were also gaps within U.S. guidelines in determining 
what agency receives information reports regarding terrorism (Cain & DoD, 2010). The 
gaps in these laws and policies indicated that the apprehension of terrorists domestic or 
abroad could be problematic. For example, Heyman reported no boundaries limiting 
terrorists from being tipped off that they were wanted or that those entities would act as 




Osama Bin Laden (Heyman, 2000). Thus, the social construction from country to 
country, state to state, community to community, agency to agency, or even person to 
person held varying degrees of, if any, accountability policy. 
From officers disobeying existing policies regarding Hassan (Cain & DoD, 2010) 
to the FBI and DEA’s failures to arrest Headley despite reports by his wife and 
community members about his behavior (Sorensen, 2016), policy enforcing 
accountability was lacking. Additionally, CHS (2014) was adamant about holding the 
FBI and Homeland Security accountable for failing to share and communicate terrorist 
operations information to state and local agencies. Cain and DoD also acknowledged that 
leadership and accountability measures needed implementation. However, such 
accountability requires a new social construction between agencies and an understanding 
of what constitutes a radicalized terrorist. 
Identification of the terrorist mindset begins with understanding the mindset 
pathway (Borum, 2012a). Once the various stages of radicalization are understood, 
identifying factors categorize quickly into a social construction model. For example, the 
information provided by CHS (2014) redundantly indicated similarities in the patterns of 
behavior of Bledsoe, Hassan, Mateen, and others. According to CHS, Tsarnaev, Haasan, 
and Bledsoe were subjects of interest to Homeland Security. The FBI and DEA had 
numerous opportunities to arrest Headley; however, Headley had provided valid 
information to the DEA, leading to arrests, which resulted in Headley’s statement falling 
to the wayside (Sorensen, 2016). Likewise, Hassan’s dissertation and PowerPoint 




communication, local and state authorities could have assisted in apprehending those lone 
wolf extremists and others with violent agendas. 
Interagency Communication 
Thus, the importance of communication between enforcement organizations, 
departments, and personnel was critical; however, a systemic failure between the FBI & 
DoD occurred, allowing a radicalized lone wolf terrorist to attack (A Ticking Time 
Bomb, 2011). Both agencies had enough information indicating Hassan’s radicalization, 
and both agencies failed to act (A Ticking Time Bomb, 2011). That communication 
failure raised concerns about the governments’ ability to handle a terrorist attack (A 
Ticking Time Bomb, 2011). CHS (2014) found errors and failures connecting the dots to 
Tsarnaev as well. According to CHS, there was a lack of communication between 
agencies regarding signs of Tsarnaev’s radicalization. 
Such information was critical because it supplemented intelligence and 
communication sharing (Sorensen, 2016); thereby, de-normalizing terrorist social 
construction rather than normalizing it. However, personal experience and literature 
review demonstrated that domestic agencies frequently demonstrated the same exclusive 
authority and sharing practices as foreign agencies. For example, Heymann (2000) 
reported that U.S. surveillance in a country, even one with a close partnership, would be 
uncommon and conducted exclusively with the authorization and collaboration of local 
authorities due to international law and diplomacy. This social construct association was 
relevant because it described the complexity of the surveillance of terrorists domestically 




operations to motivate lone wolf activity and radicalize and recruit followers; thus, 
domestic terrorism often had international correlations. CHS recommended interagency 
training and drilling as imperative strategies to maintaining an effective response to 
terrorist incidents; albeit, differing agency institutional cultures provide challenges.  
Institutional Culture 
At the time of the Fort Hood attack, DoD and the FBI had inept institutional 
cultures that did not provide adequate policies and training (A Ticking Time Bomb, 
2011). DoD service members did not recognize violent radicalization nor differentiate 
terrorist ideology from the practice of peaceful Islam (A Ticking Time Bomb, 2011). 
Understanding social construction and recognizing the various stages of Borum’s (2012a) 
model could significantly aid training. For example, during the Boston Marathon, 
Tsarnaev launched an attack against the Watertown Police Department using improvised 
explosive devices and high-powered weapons (CHS, 2014). Had preparedness policy and 
associated training been developed from Borum’s model in conjunction with Berger and 
Luckmann’s (1966) social construction theory, enforcement personnel could have been 
better able to circumvent the attack. On a positive note, according to CHS, the Boston 
Commissioner and the Watertown Police Department Chief discussed maintaining the 
National Incident Management System (NIMS) training with other agencies and 
continuing to maintain an open line of communication with other departments.  
The Commissioner and Police Chief strategized the importance of understanding 
other agencies’ command and control operations to equip law enforcement with 




(CHS, 2014). In other words, agencies needed to be aware of each other’s social 
construction because they serve communities. Cain and DoD (2010) posited that 
commanders need to be more aware of the behavioral indicators displayed when people 
were probable to commit violent acts or were becoming radicalized; thus, Borum’s 
(2012a) terrorist mindset model. While policies mandating interagency participation and 
sharing remained inadequate, CHS did indicate the need to foster relationships with other 
agencies by providing the proper resources to carry out their duties. 
Resources 
Alone, existing agencies were ill-equipped to counter radicalized lone wolf 
terrorists (A Ticking Time Bomb, 2011; Cain & DoD, 2010; CHS, 2014). According to 
CHS, during the Boston Marathon bombings, NIMS, and the Urban Areas Security 
Initiatives Funding (UASIF) provided resources to equip responding Police Departments 
with personnel and equipment addressing the incident. NIMS, UASIF, the DoD’s Threat 
Management Unit, the Navy’s Fusion Center, and the U.S. Postal Service’s (USPS) 
Threat Assessment Management Teams were valuable resources; however, their isolated 
use was counterproductive. Both Cain and DoD and CHS demonstrated the importance of 
maintaining funding and the necessary systems to address future attacks and incidents. 
Both Cain and DoD and CHS presented supporting discussion for combining resources; 
however, such interagency collaboration did not adopt such into policy and practice. 
Policy Extension 
Public policy related to lone wolf terrorist attacks needed further development. 




financial institutions and the methods used for surveillance. However, those laws did not 
address existing policy and intelligence methods (Vadum, 2017). CHS (2014) 
demonstrated that the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA) and Terrorism Risk 
Insurance Extension Act of 2005 (TRIEA; 2005) could extend to sustain local 
communities and businesses suffering financial losses due to terrorist activity. However, 
according to the Insurance Information Institute (2019), “by early 2002, 45 states had 
approved [terrorism] exclusion for standard commercial policies” (para. 21). Both the 
TRIA and TRIEA were limited to terroristic attacks by foreign perpetrators. 
Consequently, the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program (TRIPRA; 2007) created a loss-
sharing program, and TRIPRA (2015) expanded the definition of terrorism to include 
anyone acting in association with foreign people or interests, including domestic 
terrorism. Despite the associated risk-sharing reliefs provided by these policies, public 
policy related to identifying and apprehending lone wolf terrorists remained insufficient.  
The United States is a Democratic Republic, otherwise referred to as a 
representative democracy, wherein the citizens vote for politicians and policies (Madison, 
1787; Volokh, 2015). Therefore, the information communicated to the populace impacted 
and swayed public opinion. Cain and DoD (2010) recommended that enforcement 
agencies reevaluate their background policies and consider making the necessary changes 
by re-examining the necessity of their national and local agency and credit checks. 
According to Cain and DoD, such background checks should include DOD clearances, 
training commanders, supervisors, and legal advisors regarding identification and 




threats and inspections related to citizenship and clearances ensuring appropriate threat 
mitigation. 
Subsequently, such policy and practice evaluation and reevaluation are essential 
to identifying potential terrorists and lone wolf terrorists embedded within existing 
infrastructures. Vadum (2017) demonstrated examples of terrorist ideology successfully 
embedded into existing policy and how policy was molded and structured to promote 
these ideas. Vadum identified specific political kickbacks and racial hostilities. Vadum 
identified policies and positions that embraced the fundamental tenets of terrorist 
ideology and, subsequently, aligned with Borum’s (2012a) terrorist mindset in 
conjunction with Berger and Luckmann’s (1966) social construction theory. However, 
Netanyahu (2001) emphasized the terrorist’s intentional use of violence, which aligned 
with Borum’s fourth stage; rarely do terrorists attempt intimidation. Netanyahu 
effectively connected social construction to counter terrorism strategies by presenting 
principles and components critical for lawmakers to incorporate into existing policies to 
thwart terrorist activity. Netanyahu recommended ten keys to curb terrorism:  
• Impose sanctions on suppliers of nuclear technology to terrorist states.  
• Impose diplomatic, economic, and military sanctions on the terrorist states 
themselves.  
• Neutralize terrorist enclaves.  
• Freeze financial assets in the West of terrorist regimes and organizations.  




• Revise legislation to enable greater surveillance and action against organizations 
inciting violence, subject to periodic renewal.  
• Actively pursue terrorists.  
• Do not release jailed terrorists.  
• Train special forces to fight terrorism.  
• Educate the public. (p. 132)  
Even though the United States mirrored many of these principles, lone wolf terrorists 
(i.e., Bledsoe, Hassan, Tsarnaev) circumvented these principles to carry out their plots 
(Cain &DoD, 2010). According to Cain and DoD, both government and law enforcement 
failed to uphold established principles.  
While it is simple to state that more stringent policy and policy enforcement 
might solve the problem, other scholars debated that too much public oversight could 
push lone wolves further up Borum’s (2012a) terrorist pathway. Leone and Anrig (2003) 
discussed the way policies and laws affected citizens’ liberties as Americans after 9-11. 
Discussing the Pentagon’s Total Information Awareness Initiative (TIA), Leone and 
Anrig posited concern for Americans’ freedoms. Using TIA, Leone and Anrig gathered 
data about citizens, including credit information, internet service provider details and 
usage, airline information, and more. The objective of TIA was to gain intelligence about 
individuals for suspicious terrorist activity (Stevens, 2003). The Supreme Court upheld 
several cases wherein, by a citizen’s use of associated technologies, those citizens 
accepted the liability that government eavesdroppers might use it as well (Leone & 




able to appeal any decision rendered because those citizens freely provided their 
information for a service. However, due to the nature of U.S. society (i.e., Berger and 
Luckmann’s [1966] social construction theory), Americans were forced to assimilate to 
technology (i.e., banking statements online, billing statements online). Therefore, Leone 
and Anrig questioned whether TIA was a deterrent or an infringement. According to 
Leone and Anrig, an operation like TIA posed extreme peril and served as an avenue for 
spying and intimidation without limits and supervision. 
TIA and its predecessor, the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 
allowed the government to surveil citizens and were later enhanced to include searches 
(Leone & Anrig, 2003). According to Leone and Anrig, FISA allowed wiretap approvals 
more easily than official criminal investigations' laws. Much like Stevens (2003) reported 
of TIA, FISA did not mandate a need for probable cause of criminal activity. Neither 
policy required notification of the surveillance to the target unless they needed the 
information in a criminal proceeding (Leone & Anrig, 2003; Stevens, 2003). The Patriot 
Act (United States, 2001) recently created enhanced access and gave more power to the 
government to obtain information by decreasing barriers for law enforcement and foreign 
counterintelligence. The consequences of these policies and associated slant journalistic 
reporting could drive citizens to withhold data crucial to identifying radicalizing lone 
wolf terrorists due to social construction. With this research, I explored how social 
construction presented in journalistic reporting influenced the normalization of radical 
lone wolf behavior. Since policy affects communication and fewer than 10 percent of 




Newport, 2014), internet communication, the technology in which citizens communicate, 
is not infringed. Based on my literature search, I found no indication of a terrorist event 
as big as 9-11 since 2011. However, the lone wolf threat and attacks persisted. Existing 
policy  
• Lacked accountability and measures (Cain & DoD, 2010) 
• Lacked adequate interagency communication (A Ticking Time Bomb, 2011; 
CHS, 2014) 
• Lacked avenues to pursue appropriate action addressing radicalization and violent 
extremism (A Ticking Time Bomb, 2011) 
• Must address the four phases that need further attention by law enforcement 
directly tied to radicalization: “One-Pre-Radicalization, Two-Self-Identification, 
Three-Indoctrination, and Four-Violence” (A Ticking Time Bomb, 2011, p. 72) 
• Must address Netanyahu’s (2001) list of ten factors 
• Journalistic reports should warn or advise the public about issues before radical 
lone wolf events taking place (Bergen, 2017), not normalize them 
Islamophobia and Historical Repetition 
Values, attitudes, beliefs, and expectations (VABEs; Clawson, 2012) associated 
with racial phobia versus human rights further influenced the U.S. social construct. For 
example, Vadum (2017) claimed that civil rights activists purposefully infiltrated the U.S. 
government and society to normalize Sharia and related terrorist concepts. At the same 
time, Cole and Dempsey (2006) warned about the dangers of repeating past U.S. 




and citizens during World War II (WWII). In either case, those in power influenced 
social construct using situational public reporting. Vadum posited that the Center for 
Constitutional Rights (CCR) was a radical activist group that diverted the purpose of U.S. 
tax laws toward terroristic goals. According to Vadum, CCR and similar non-profit 
groups created an area of legality within which terrorist recruiting and organization 
happen. Vadum also emphasized the danger of the politically correct (PC) social 
construct spreading throughout American culture to counter Islamophobia. According to 
Vadum, such PC activism promoting an expectation that no one speaks negatively or 
stigmatize Islam (i.e., respect for civil rights). Vadum noted that U.S. Islamic enemies 
were using PC in the same manner as U.S. Soviet Communist enemies: To prevent any 
contrary social construction about Islam, Muslims, or Sharia. Vadum extensively referred 
to the hostilities that politicians and policymakers were subjected to when presenting 
policy addressing the terrorist ideology problem, noting that some policymakers 
acquiesced and provided policy favoring terrorist ideology.  
While civil rights policies may appease the Islamic Extremist and other Domestic 
Terrorist groups within the United States (i.e., WAR, Army of God, KKK; Vadum, 
2017), Cole and Dempsey (2006) demonstrated that civil rights policies are necessary. 
For example, in 1919, the U.S. government reacted to terrorist bombings by forcefully 
rounding up immigrants numbering in the thousands from close to 39 cities throughout 
the country (Cole & Dempsey, 2006). Those individuals were undetained because of 
connections to terrorist organizations and their political affiliations (Cole & Dempsey, 




thirds of whom were U.S. citizens, were put in internment camps because they were of 
Japanese descent unassociated with any national security threat (Cole & Dempsey, 2006). 
In these examples, a social construct of fear permeated the Nation’s leaders resulting in 
tragic civil and human rights injustices. Vadum posited that societal fear also caused the 
opposite reaction; rather than detaining innocent civilians, terrorists go free. For example, 
because they did not want to be altercasted as Islamophobic, neighbors in San 
Bernardino, CA, failed to report suspicious behavior that ultimately resulted in a mass 
killing of innocent people and employees at a community-based social service clinic 
(Vadum, 2017). Islamic states continued attempting to persuade the United Nations (UN) 
to criminalize Islamophobia; thus, Vadum emphasized the importance of controlling U.S. 
borders and immigration in countering the war on terror.  
While constructing society to believe that all Muslims were terrorists was 
inhumane, so was a social construction that normalized terrorist activities; thus, 
policymakers must develop policy that supports the rights and safety of all people. 
However, instituted and enforced new policies must be measured and critiqued for 
intended effectiveness. Policymakers cannot create public policy associated with 
radicalized lone wolf terrorists if those policymakers do not understand societal construct 
normalization. Thus, lone wolf psychology must be comprehended. 
Lone Wolf Psychology 
Understanding how lone wolf terrorists think or what drives them to the violent 
acts they pursue is crucial to developing effective policy, strategies, and training designed 




scholars researched terrorist psychology using various theoretical frameworks, all 
associations fit well within Borum’s (2012a) pathway and related to Berger and 
Luckmann’s (1966) social construction theory. Kaczynski (2009) was a loner diagnosed 
with psychological problems and, according to Simon (2013), displayed behavior like 
other lone wolves. Crenshaw (2000) inferred that current terrorists were not different 
from past terrorists because they were pragmatic and had comprehensible aims, which 
aligned with Dass-Brailsford’s (2008) report that some terrorists adopted past and current 
terroristic rhetoric for their cause. While Dass-Brailsford identified common factors 
within the psychology of terrorists, Vaisman (2006) inferred that there was no set profile 
of a terrorist. However, Vaisman also noted that socio-economic causation factors were a 
part of the fundamental structure of terrorism, and terrorists’ emotional needs were 
satisfied through associated terrorist network organizations. Victoroff (2005) used several 
theories to explain the mindset of a terrorist, and Volpato et al. (2010) demonstrated the 
shared beliefs of terrorists using Sprinzak’s (2007) delegitimization theory. Steiner 
(2012) posited that culture, religion, social, and economic factors were precursors of 
terrorist ideology; Townsend (2007) demonstrated a mindset pattern in suicidal terrorists, 
and Rominek (2012) related the terrorist psychology of group belonging. DeAngelis 
(2009) demonstrated that people opened to radicalization were angry, alienated, or 
disenfranchised from society. Staub (1999) posited that terrorism began when the needs 
of a minority group went unaddressed, and those feelings of injustice served as precursors 
to terrorism and violence. For example, Stack described slamming a small plane into the 




Katz, 2010; Kennedy, 2010; Smoking Gun, 2010; Weisenthal, 2010). All these 
explanations revolved around the construct of society, the minority group, the terrorist 
network, and the social construction of the terrorist; and all can be associated with 
various stages of Borum’s (2003) four-stage process of terrorist, ideological 
development: 
• One - Social and Economic Deprivation; 
• Two - Inequality and Resentment; 
• Three - Blame/Attribution; and 
• Four - Generalizing/Stereotyping/Dehumanizing/Demonizing the enemy cause. 
(p. 9)  
Stage One - Social and Economic Deprivation  
Understanding the roots of terrorism and the profiles of terrorists helped me 
comprehend the psychological makeup of a radical lone wolf terrorist. Using inductive 
theory, Vaisman (2006) qualitatively observed some fundamental components that lead 
to terrorism. According to Vaisman, many social psychology models developed to 
understand the social organization, group structures, and criminal and drug smuggling 
behaviors parallel the developments in terrorist social communities. Both Vaisman and 
Dass-Brailsford (2008) discussed the terrorist’s emotional needs using Maslow’s (1943) 
theory of motivation hierarchy, which also aligned with Berger and Luckmann’s (1966) 
theory of social construction. Borum (2003, 2012a), Townsend (2007), Dass-Brailsford, 
and Vaisman, among others, posited that a lack of emotional fulfillment, support, and 




levels. For example, Kaczynski (2009) was a highly intellectual person, a Harvard 
graduate with a doctorate in mathematics, and a radicalized lone wolf terrorist. 
The social construction of the terrorist’s environment catalyzed the terrorist 
mindset into stage one of Borum’s (2012a) model. In discussing the role psychology and 
psychiatry play in developing groups and individual terrorists, Townsend (2007) 
connected terrorists’ social interactions, or lack thereof, to terrorists’ attacks and future 
attacks. According to Townsend, despite inter-group conflicts, outcasts in society 
(terrorists) needed to be accepted to a cause, group, group’s identity, or group objective 
to become radicalized. Townsend interviewed 35 incarcerated Middle Eastern terrorists 
who stated that they joined their terrorist groups due to peer pressure. After they joined, 
loyalty to the group was critical to comprehend the reason behind suicide terrorism 
(Townsend, 2007). Townsend posited that, within the mindsets of suicidal lone wolf 
terrorists, each terrorist was willing to die for the cause. Granted, Townsend focused on 
the psychology of terrorist organizations and their ability to motivate lone wolf suicide 
attacks. However, Townsend's findings aligned with Berger and Luckmann’s (1966) 
theory of social construction, Dass-Brailsford’s emotional correlations, Maslow’s (1943) 
motivational hierarchy, and Vaisman’s (2006) and Borum’s connection of the terrorist’s 
VABEs to social and economic deprivation. According to Maslow, feelings of 
deprivation evolved into beliefs of inequality and resentment. 
Stage Two - Inequality and Resentment 
Violence comes from the frustration of basic human needs not being met, and 




(Staub, 1999; Victoroff, 2005). Several sources (Huffington Post, 2010; Katz, 2010; 
Kennedy, 2010; Smoking Gun, 2010; Weisenthal, 2010) printed Stack’s final statement 
wherein the radicalized lone wolf terrorist poignantly exampled this theory: 
While very few working people would say they haven’t had their fair share of 
taxes, in my lifetime, I can say with a great degree of certainty that there has 
never been a politician cast a vote on any matter with the likes of me or my 
interests in mind. Nor, for that matter, are they the least bit interested in me or 
anything I have to say. (p. 1)  
Stack entered Borum’s (2012a) stage two due to feelings of unjust taxing by the IRS and 
the government upon the populace. According to Stack, the U.S. government was 
corruptly taking advantage of the tax system to brainwash or gain the advantage over the 
populace to forcefully comply with their legal system (Huffington Post, 2010; Katz, 
2010; Kennedy, 2010; Smoking Gun, 2010; Weisenthal, 2010). Stack thought that the 
American system was full of corruption and disillusion.  
Consequently, concepts of inequality and resentment were often responsible for 
the violence. Robins and Post (1997) argued that political paranoia was responsible for 
every social disaster in history and was an underlying root cause for the decline of the 
West. Steiner (2012) used Fukuyama’s (1992) end of history theory and Hare’s (1993) 
psychopath checklist to dissect Bin Laden’s terroristic reasonings and demonstrated how 
Al Qaeda used propaganda and rationale to justify their actions. For example, Al Qaeda 
drew its strategies extensively from tactics used by the Jews, Russians, Romans, and 




noted the membership prerequisites required by Al Qaeda, both qualifications and 
characteristics, albeit the entirety of those prerequisites did not correlate entirely with 
Borum’s (2012a) model. According to Steiner, Al Qaeda members must:  
• Be Muslim.  
• Be committed.  
• Be mature.  
• Be willing to sacrifice their lives.  
• Be good listeners and be obedient.  
• Keep secrets and conceal information.  
• Be free of illness.  
• Possess patience.  
• Possess tranquility and unflappability.  
• I possess intelligence and insight.  
• Be cautious and prudent.  
• Possess the ability to observe and analyze.  
• Positions and conceal oneself. (p. 72)  
However, Steiner's requirements did correlate with Berger and Luckmann’s (1966) theory 
of social construction in that Al Qaeda purposefully constructed the society of its 
members. Additionally, Steiner’s findings provided insight into how lone wolf terrorists 
possessing Al Qaeda ideology and affiliation carried out lone wolf-style attacks under the 
auspices of Al Qaeda to advance the lone wolf’s own “leaderless” beliefs. From the 




within the Al Qaeda member prerequisites in the same manner that Straub (1999) posited 
that violence begets violence if group needs remain unaddressed. 
Violence will continue to exist and escalate if basic needs remain unmet 
(Fukuyama, 1992; Maslow, 1943; Straub, 1999). According to Straub, socioeconomic 
conditions and individuals' must be part of the clique because they are fundamental 
factors that perpetuate violence and terror. Applying Straub’s ideology, individuals not 
meeting all prerequisites to Al Qaeda membership would feel socially disadvantaged and 
resent ostracization, subsequently feeling unequal to actual members. Given those 
feelings of inequality and resentfulness, Steiner’s (2012) list of Al Qaeda membership 
prerequisites does correlate with Borum’s (2012a) model. Socioeconomic disadvantage, 
inequality, social exclusion, and resentment beget fear and insecurity within society 
(Straub, 1999). Straub inferred that those fears and insecurities allowed terrorist groups to 
control the actions of the populace so that the minority group could gain control; thus, 
meeting the needs of the minority group over the needs of the broader population. Staub 
developed those associations based on observations of people living in Rwanda, East 
Africa, by examining the socialization of youth leading to aggression and violence. Many 
scholars posited that left unaddressed, feelings of inequality and resentment naturally 
escalate to blame and attribution (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Borum, 2003, 2012a, 
2012b; Dass-Brailsford, 2008; Fukuyama, 1992; Hare, 1993; Maslow, 1943; Straub, 





Stage Three - Blame/attribution 
Radicalizing lone wolf terrorists possessed strikingly similar psychological 
mindsets wherein they became consumed with a need to blame or attribute their (or their 
group’s) disadvantaged situations on a more powerful entity such as a government power 
(Borum, 2003, 2012a, 2012b; Straub, 1999). For example, Stack claimed that anyone 
who stood up against the government imposed upon U.S. citizens would be punished and 
labeled a crackpot (Huffington Post, 2010; Katz, 2010; Kennedy, 2010; Smoking Gun, 
2010; Weisenthal, 2010). This blame stage was critical in the radicalization process as it 
supplied the justification prevalent within the lone wolf’s VABEs (Borum, 2003, 2012a, 
2012b; Dass-Brailsford, 2008; Vaisman, 2006). Vaisman attributed socioeconomic 
causation for the terrorist’s blame as a fundamental part of their mental and emotional 
structure. Dass-Brailsford related the need for the terrorist to attribute their emotions to 
their needs not being met. Victoroff (2005) and Volpato et al. inferred that terrorists 
shared beliefs associated with blaming those they felt caused the unjust situation. 
Sprinzak (2007) and Steiner (2012) demonstrated that culture, religion, social, and 
economic factors all gave cause to terrorists' blame and justification of their actions. 
Following Maslow’s (1943) hierarchy, feelings of disservice or injustice motivated 
negative behaviors. 
Alienation, disenfranchisement, anger, fear, isolation, and similar feelings led to 
varying degrees of violence, from vandalism to suicide bombings (DeAngelis, 2009; 
Rominek, 2012; Staub, 1999; Townsend, 2007). The radicalized lone wolf terrorist felt 




adopted increasingly aggressive means to be heard (Borum, 2003). In the terrorists’ 
minds, society delegitimized their concerns. That delegitimization resulted in the terrorist 
instigating violent inter-group conflict (Volpato et al., 2010). Volpato et al. reported that 
delegitimization began with a yearning to raise or distinguish the delegitimized faction to 
a legitimized level within the more extensive societal notice. Many terrorists feel they 
must make those responsible pay for their inflicted injustices (Borum, 2003, 2012a, 
2012b; DeAngelis, 2009; Dass-Brailsford, 2008; Rominek, 2012; Staub, 1999; 
Townsend, 2007; Volpato et al., 2010; Vaisman, 2006). According to Borum (2012a), 
once the radicalized lone wolf terrorist targeted the entity, they believed responsible for 
the perceived injustice, that terrorist typically moves into planning and executing violent 
demonstrations. 
Stage Four - Generalizing/stereotyping/dehumanizing/demonizing 
Terrorism is deliberate and systematic violence performed by a small number of 
people (Crenshaw, 2000). According to Crenshaw, the purpose of terrorism was to 
exploit the lack of security within a community by using violence to control a populace 
through fear or intimidation. However, Dass-Brailsford (2008) and Crenshaw posited that 
terrorism was not a personality disorder or irrational thinking; instead, terrorism was a 
way of causing fear to assert power over a populace. In other words, terrorists were not 
daft individuals but human beings with a set agenda dedicated to creating a society 
formatted to fit their needs. Albeit Kaczynski (2009) was diagnosed with psychiatric 
disorders; however, Rominek (2012), Victoroff (2005), and Dass-Brailsford noted that 




achieve the desired result deliberately and methodically. Crenshaw said that historically 
terrorists generally sought short-term political power through revolution, national 
liberation, or secession. Crenshaw posited that modern terrorists, often motivated by 
religious imperatives, seek to transform the world. Thus, the terrorist dehumanizes or 
demonizes those they seek to terrorize. 
As the targets of the terrorist became less human, planning and perpetrating 
violence against them became more straightforward and necessary to protect the innocent 
(Borum, 2003). The frustrations of the terrorist then move quickly into aggressive, 
violent execution (Borum, 2003; Staub, 1999; Victoroff, 2005). Victoroff demonstrated 
that numerous components make up a terrorist; thus, a terrorist’s mind remains 
unexplained using one term. However, Borum’s (2012a) model does not utilize a single 
term to explain a terrorist. Instead, Borum (2003, 2012a, 2012b) provides a mindset 
pathway to terroristic radicalization applicable to a wide variety of terrorist personalities. 
Regardless of which psychological model one employs, Dass-Brailsford’s (2008), 
Rominek’s (2012), Staub’s, Victoroff’s, or others; the sociological nature of Borum’s 
(2012a) pathway provides a sound foundation for understanding the terrorist 
radicalization process. Thus, combining Borum’s (2012a) model with Berger and 
Luckmann’s (1966) theory of social construction provided insight into the lone wolf 
terrorist’s social construction. 
Social Construction and The Lone Wolf Terrorist 
Understanding lone wolf social construction was critical to identifying lone 




construction as “an idea that has been created and accepted by the people in a society” 
(para. 1). However, Boghossian (2001) posited that social construction was not 
contingent on aspects of a society’s citizens’ social selves. Even though Boghossian 
believed that people could not shape society, many noted scholars demonstrated 
otherwise. Leeds-Huwitz (2016) reported that “social construction assumes that people 
construct (i.e., create, make, invent) their understandings of the world and the meanings 
they give to encounters with others, or various products they or others create” (para. 1). 
Thus, as Berger and Luckmann (1966) demonstrated, social construction was a process 
wherein people create ideas and perceive their experiences, encounters, and beliefs as a 
societal reality.  
Whether in groups or instances of lone wolves, indoctrination was part of the 
terrorist social construct (Rominek, 2012; Steiner, 2012). While both Rominek and 
Steiner discussed the ideology behind the recruitment of terrorist cell networks, Rominek 
focused on the practices used to brainwash cell prospects and members into believing that 
suicide bombing gives purpose to the terrorist’s existence in life. Albeit Rominek utilized 
the cultural r/k theory to provide classification to cultural processes, Rominek’s findings 
still aligned with Berger and Luckmann’s (1966) theory of social construction.  
Using the Al Qaeda membership prerequisite list documented by Steiner, the 
correlation becomes clear. Al Qaeda’s membership requirements included cultural, 
physical, and mental aspects designed to shape and build their society; thus, their social 
construction mimics cultural r/k theory’s balance of internal and external selection. 




to be part of the “in-group,” the click or faction the terrorist saw as noble or worthy. This 
societal construct worked for the lone wolf effectively as the group collective (Bergen, 
2017; Rominek, 2012; Simon, 2013; Stakelbeck, 2015; Steiner, 2012). DeAngelis (2009) 
and Rominek inferred that understanding these correlations provided the means of early 
identification, and potentially subsequent reform, of the identified would-be terrorists. 
However, Rominek also posited that these characteristics minimized the effectiveness of 
the indoctrination process vital to the development of a terrorist cell network or the 
creation of leaderless resistance.  
Despite potential indoctrination and communication failures, a growing lone wolf 
society exists in the United States (Bergen, 2017). According to Bergen, several areas in 
the US had links to terrorist organizations; thus, the associated communities had become 
normalized to the terrorist presence and activities. McQueeney (2014) demonstrated a 
link between the media’s use of social construction to elaborate on justice issues and the 
inability of twenty-first-century students to evaluate the information and stereotypes 
discussed by those media. According to McQueeney, 
From a social constructionist perspective, social problems should not be taken for 
granted as objective conditions that afflict society…terrorism is constructed 
through the interpretation of events, the use of claims made up of language 
symbols, and work of claims-makers to attract the public’s attention and sway 
public opinion in support of some interests over others. (p. 298)  
McQueeney used media to further students’ understanding of social construction about 




their opinions and ideas about real-life situations. Spencer (2012) identified four 
metaphors that media sources used to create the idea of terrorism: war, crime, uncivilized 
evil, and disease. Spencer posited that the use of metaphors created the desired 
government response and influenced counterterrorism policies. According to Spencer, “a 
metaphorical understanding of political phenomena such as terrorism can give 
international relations insights into how certain policies become possible while others 
remain outside of the range of options thought to be appropriate” (p. 1). As reported by 
the media, social construction could also communicate terroristic ideas and policies. 
While an everyday media norm was to depict terrorists as pathological, quickly 
identified, outcasts (Cole, 1996; Ferran & Meek, 2018), that normalized view obfuscated 
terrorists amid society (Graham, 2016). On the contrary, lone wolves were often 
intelligent, as was apparent in the Fort Hood Shooting by U.S. Army Major Hassan and 
Mathematics Professor Kaczynski. According to Kaczynski (2009), the lone wolf desired 
their causes be publicized and was intelligent enough to use society’s media sources to 
that end. Turk (2004) also demonstrated how a terrorist used social construction to 
construct their reality. According to Turk, 
The most significant contribution of sociological thinking to our understanding of 
terrorism is the realization that it is a social construction. Contrary to the 
impression fostered by official incidence courts and media reports, terrorism is 
not a given in the real world but instead is an interpretation of events and their 




Thus, Turk established that terrorism was interpreted by individuals differently. Turk also 
stated that,  
The construction and selective application of definitions of terrorism are 
embodied in the dynamics of political conflicts, where individual warfare to 
political conflicts, where ideological warfare to cast the enemy as an evildoer, is a 
dimension of the struggle to win support for one’s own cause.” (p. 1)  
This information aligned with Spencer’s (2012) inference that metaphors strategically 
communicate ideas and influence policies. 
However, when intelligence information is crucial to the safety of a populace and 
national security, reliable information is critical to creating an adequate response, which 
means that social construction impacts society. Whatever society constructs becomes 
normalized by individuals within that society, and society’s citizens see those 
normalizations as acceptable (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). Thus, the method by which 
normalization occurred within a society was an integral part of that normalization process 
because it communicated what was acceptable and unacceptable within a society. 
According to Jenkins (2003), “as so often in terrorism, it is not so much the violent act 
that carries lasting historical weight, but rather the official response and the construction 
of memory” (p. 75). Jenkins effectively conveyed that social construction played a part in 





Political Slant: Communication that Normalizes Terrorism 
Journalists provided the meaning of events by deciphering them with pictures and 
words, which influenced what is relevant to the journalist’s audience (Ruigrok & van 
Atteveldt, 2007). Ruigrok and van Atteveldt studied the journalistic framing of terrorist 
attacks in American, British, and Dutch news outlets. According to Wolfsfeld (1997), 
current events influence what media covers; thus, journalists impacted the populace’s 
attitudes. Ruigrok and van Atteveldt connected “mass communication and public 
attitudes preferences when he [Wolfsfeld] stated the way in which the world imagined 
what men will do” (p. 68). Druckman and Parkin (2005) demonstrated how editorial slant 
affected voters’ social construction. According to Druckman and Parkin, “voters often 
base their candidate evaluations on the issues emphasized in the news, and they form 
their opinions about events in ways that correspond with how the news frames those 
events” (p. 1030). Therefore, journalists used framing to report what they think their 
audience will find valuable and how they believed that the audience should perceive what 
the journalist was reporting to influence social construction. Ruigrok and van Atteveldt 
defined journalistic framing as, 
Selecting aspects of a perceived reality and making them more salient in 
communicating text in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, 
causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the 
item described. (p. 69)  
Ruigrok and van Atteveldt demonstrated how several events reported in American, 




countries, thus, creating different social constructs. The framing was considered standard 
practice by journalists (Ruigrok & van Atteveldt, 2007).  
Journalistic reporting, editorial columns, and critic reviews all contained elements 
of framing (Druckman & Parkin, 2005). Druckman and Parkin conducted an exit poll 
assessing the slant of the 1988 and 1992 Senate campaign coverage. Peake (2007) 
examined media coverage of the 2006 U.S. Presidential campaign from June to October. 
In both studies, the researchers found significant voter influence resulting from the media 
coverage's political slant directed toward shaping society. Druckman and Parkin found 
that editorial endorsements affected the tone of and criticisms printed regarding the 
incumbents. Peake reported that local journalists usually re-wrote newswire reports 
because of the editor’s requirements.  
Society’s construct also influenced the slant of journalistic reporting. For 
example, Peake (2007) determined that market pressures and political atmosphere 
impacted the reports' coverage, tone, and space within news outlets. Additionally, Peake 
found that local press covered the presidential election less frequently than the prestige 
press. However, Peake reported that local news reports sometimes lack experience in 
public policy compared to prestige press journalists. Like Ruigrok and van Atteveldt’s 
(2007) and Song’s (2004) findings, Peake determined that the journalists’ ontology 
shaped how they socially construct the readers’ realities. These findings aligned strongly 
with Berger and Luckmann’s (1966) theory of social construction. Furthermore, Peake 
noted that “the one area most careful studies of news bias appear to agree on is that 




Bias might stem from editors, owners, and journalists as suggested by the 
sociological model or bias might arise from the newspaper’s audience and its 
advertisers as suggested by the economic model. Media firms may slant their 
news reports toward the beliefs of their community to satisfy their audience and 
maximize profit. (p. 56) 
Peake used a least-squares regression to sample 98 news outlets, then repeated that 
regression excluding news outlets that did not cover the election or were considered a 
prestige press. While Peake and Ruigrok and van Atteveldt focused on journalism in 
general, Song categorized the political slant of freelance journalists. Among Song’s 15 
categories of slant were topic, affiliation, and ideological perspective, which provided 
correlative insight between the four studies. Song noted that, 
Op-Ed page editors tend to select freelancer authors whose articles were 
compatible with the ideological orientation of each newspaper. These findings are 
consistent with Ciofalo’s and Traverso’s study of the Op-Ed Editors, which 
concluded that a paper’s editorial policies and stands influenced the choice of 
free-lancer authored Op-Ed pieces. (p. 49) 
All four scholars, Druckman and Parkin, Peake, Ruigrok and van Atteveldt, and Song 
found that the organizational culture of news outlets, regardless of freelance, local, or 
prestige, promoted slanted reporting practices.  
Considering the threat of the radicalizing lone wolf terrorist hidden within a 
society wherein the terrorist’s activities were normalized could hinder identification of 




construction represents a significant problem. Political slant may be jeopardizing 
objective and fair reporting, but more importantly, preventing timely identification of 
radicalizing lone wolf terrorists. Recognizing the normalization of terrorist actions 
resulting from journalistic reporting would help policymakers, and enforcement officials 
curb those terrorist activities resulting in positive social change.  
Implications for Positive Social Change 
Implications for social change include improved enforcement training and 
procedures, increased public safety, and potential perpetrator reformation. These positive 
changes represent a piece of the overall positive change to the social construct of U.S. 
society. By furthering social scientific understanding of how politically slanted 
journalistic reporting normalizes radicalizing lone wolf activity, policymakers can 
improve public policy and associated results. 
Public Policy Implications 
Public policy development and enforcement operations related to protecting 
society from lone wolf terrorists depend on the intelligence gathered and shared (A 
Ticking Time Bomb, 2011; Cain & DoD, 2010; CHS, 2014; Sorensen, 2016). Existing 
public policy related to lone wolf terrorism was insufficient to support enforcement 
operations and public safety; however, literature indicated a lack of understanding and 
communication were critical attributable factors (A Ticking Time Bomb, 2011; Bergen, 
2017; Cain & DoD, 2010; CHS, 2014; Cole & Dempsey, 2006; Leone & Anrig, 2003; 
Sorensen, 2016; Stevens, 2003; Vadum, 2017). As Bergen demonstrated, journalistic 




perceptions influenced intelligence communicated to enforcement agencies. Accordingly, 
public policy must include an understanding of lone wolf terrorists, consider influences 
of journalistic normalizing, and address communication issues between agencies, the 
media, and the public.  
Through my study, I furthered scientific understanding of how journalistic, 
political slant influenced the normalization of four lone wolf terrorist attacks in NYC. 
That increased understanding can help policymakers develop improved public policy in 
consideration of associated journalistic social construction. Improved public policy is 
essential to developing an improved response in communication and information sharing 
with the populace, which can aid Federal, State, and Local law enforcement agencies 
with terrorism preparedness and response; thus, improving societal safety. 
Social Change Implications 
In my professional policing experience, when enforcement agencies thwarted lone 
wolf attacks within communities, communities were more forthcoming and helpful by 
providing enforcement personnel with credible intelligence information, which, in turn, 
positively changed society. Positive social changes from my findings could include 
increased public safety, enhanced public awareness, improved communication, and 
potential reformation of radicalizing lone wolf terrorists (A Ticking Time Bomb, 2011; 
Bergen, 2017; Cain & DoD, 2010; CHS, 2014; Cole & Dempsey, 2006; Dass-Brailsford, 
2008; DeAngelis, 2009; Leone & Anrig, 2003; Sorensen, 2016; Stevens, 2003; Vadum, 
2017). Dass-Brailsford articulated the effect that terrorism had on society and the cycle of 




psychological effects on the human body and how the population recovers from terrorist 
attacks. Dass-Brailsford used Maslow’s (1943) hierarchy as a foundation for survival 
techniques within the general populace and aligned with the importance of 
communication after an incident.  
According to Dass-Brailsford (2008), those techniques were effective strategies to 
overcome emotional trials and mental pictures embedded after a terrorist attack and help 
individuals assimilate back into society. Similarly, DeAngelis (2009) associated 
communication with terrorist reformation. DeAngelis discovered how to talk terrorists 
out of committing violence using peaceful dialogue and assistance. According to 
DeAngelis, a growing number of de-radicalization programs worldwide are dedicated to 
providing support and successfully demonstrating that intervention leads to prevention. 
DeAngelis explained how terrorism develops when sociological needs remain unmet. In 
Borum’s (2012a) stages two and three, radicalizing terrorists attributed their unjust 
environment (unmet sociological needs) to a target they held responsible. Thus, applying 
DeAngelis’ findings, intervention any time before Borum’s stage four could result in the 
reformation of that terrorist into a productive member of society. My findings further 
scientific understanding of how journalism influences how society sees and interacts with 
radicalizing terrorists. Positive social change resulting from this study could extend from 
overall societal safety to every member of society's individual mental and social well-
being, including the would-be terrorist. The implications for positive change could come 
full circle as improved societal well-being could enhance communication between society 





The members of society construct their society, and those with increased 
influence play a more significant role in constructing that society; thus, journalists play a 
critical role in the social construct of society. If journalists slant or omit information, 
those journalists construct a reality wherein behavior within that society normalizes 
according to what the journalists conveyed was acceptable. If radicalizing lone wolf 
terrorist behavior or activities are normalized within society, then members of society 
will not see the threat hidden among them. By exploring the journalistic normalization of 
four lone wolf terrorist attacks in NYC, I added to scientific understandings, resulting in 
positive social change and improved public policy. Through associating findings with 
Borum’s (2012a) four-stage pathway mindset of terrorism in conjunction with a 
framework of Berger and Luckmann’s (1966) theory of social construction, I exposed 
how journalistic reporting has normalized radicalizing lone wolves.  
Chapter 2, the literature review, included the search parameters and literature 
review on (a) the proposed study framework, (b) explanation of a lone wolf, (c) research 
review, (d) patterns of behavior, (e) ideology, (f) policy, (g) psychology, (h) social 
construction, (i) communication, (j) social change, and (k) summary. Chapter 3, the 
Research Method, includes: (a) the research design and rationale, (b) role of the 
researcher, (c) methodology, (d) participant selection, (e) instrumentation, (f) data 
collection plan, (g) data analysis plan, (h) issues of trustworthiness, and (i) ethical 





Chapter 3: Research Method 
The purpose of this study was to qualitatively identify and analyze how social 
construction in journalistic reporting was normalizing radical lone wolf terrorism with 
potential variations in reporting content based on journalistic styles within the NYC 
Metropolitan area. I analyzed the online reporting of four NYC news outlets, each with 
varying positions on the political continuum from left-leaning liberal to right-leaning 
conservative. Moustakas (1994) stated that the manifestations of consciousness are 
absolute reality while world ontologies are a product of learning. By analyzing the 
patterns, communication deficiencies, and social construction relative to radical lone wolf 
terrorism events, I better understand the lone wolf terrorist phenomenon. In addition, 
findings can help analyze whether current communication and journalism strategies 
implemented regarding radical lone wolf terrorists need re-evaluation. 
This chapter identifies the methodology and foundations of the study. Chapter 3, 
the research method, includes: (a) the research design and rationale, (b) role of the 
researcher, (c) methodology, (d) participant selection, (e) instrumentation, (f) data 
collection plan, (g) data analyses plan, (h) issues of trustworthiness, and (i) ethical 
procedures. Chapter 3 begins with the rationale and justification for the proposed 
research methodology. 
Research Design and Rationale 
I designed this phenomenological study to answer the central question: How are 
socially constructed journalism stories of lone wolf terrorist events in NYC aligning with 




discover how journalistic reporting impacted the social construction of content and 
readership normalization of lone wolf terrorism behaviors. Creswell (2009) stated that the 
qualitative process provides an overall orienting study lens to address questions of 
gender, class, and race (or other issues of marginalized groups). Creswell noted how this 
lens focuses on advocacy, which shapes question types, informs data collection and 
analysis, and provides a call for action. To that end, I conducted thematic analyses from 
various journalistic reports of lone wolf terrorist activities across a political spectrum of 
online news outlets. Braun and Clarke (2006) found that “thematic analysis is a method 
for identifying, analyzing, and reporting patterns (themes) within the data” (p. 79). I 
conducted this research from a phenomenological approach.  
Phenomenology, unlike other qualitative methodologies, centers on the search for 
meaning (Moustakas, 1994). In contrast, a case study revolves around a single event, 
group, or clustered phenomenon (Creswell, 2009). Since my research involved four 
different events and three different political slants, a case study was inappropriate. An 
ethnography is a time-consuming emersion into an entire group of people over a 
prolonged period (Creswell, 2009); thus, an ethnographic study was also not appropriate 
for my research. Grounded theory studies focus on the development of theories 
(Moustakas, 1994). Since I built this study on existing theory, a grounded theory 
approach was not conducive. A narrative study centers on the lives and stories of 
individuals and their narrations about their experiences (Creswell, 2009). Although 
narrations and ideas bound this study, those narrations were journalistic accountings of 




construction and normalization, a narrative approach was inappropriate. Historical studies 
base analysis on historical events to make predictions and hypothesize about the future 
using analytical data (Rutgers, 2021). While I analyzed prior events, I did not predict 
future events; instead, I explored reports of those events that socially construct 
normalization. Thus, a historical approach was not appropriate for this study. Moustakas 
(1994) reported that “phenomenology seeks meanings from appearances and arrives at 
essences through intuition and reflection on conscious acts of experience, leading to 
ideas, concepts, judgments, and understandings” (p. 58). With this study, I use a 
phenomenological tradition to seek the meaning behind journalistic content and social 
normalization of the lone wolf phenomena.  
I derived the data from four online local news outlets in the NYC Metropolitan 
Area (NY Times, Daily News, NY Post, and Wall Street Journal), each with an editorial 
slant along a political continuum from liberal to conservative. I phrased the central 
question towards querying, identifying, and investigating journalistic content to expose 
thematic discrepancies related to the social construction of normalization of the lone wolf 
phenomena. Thus, phenomenology provided the best approach to complete this objective. 
In this tradition, my role as the researcher was critical. 
Role of the Researcher 
As the sole researcher, I impartially recorded the study information and analyzed 
the data from a neutral perspective to create a picture employing ideas and theories using 
journalistic resources. I let the research guide me in whatever direction it took me. As a 




relationship with the chosen news outlets or the local press. I also do not, and did not, 
have a preferred newspaper outlet that I follow(ed). I am leery about terrorist reports, but 
I did not allow my feelings to impede the study.  
As a retired law enforcement officer and a 9/11 first responder, I am, and was 
throughout the study, aware of my views and opinions about terrorism. Since it was 
critical to the study that I remained transparent while conducting research, I documented 
biases throughout the investigation. I accomplished this documentation by maintaining a 
reflexive journal. I also maintained a checklist with the required standards that I needed 
to meet to keep me from deviating from the study parameters and neutrality. Thus, 
through meticulous content analyses of published journalism, I investigated and 
explained whether reported stories about radical lone wolf events aligned with the 
political slant of the publication source and contributed to lone wolf terrorist 
normalization. I used several strategies of validity to produce and enhance confidence in 
the study’s outcome. Some of these strategies included an audit trail, triangulation, 
analyses, and data interpretation.  
Methodology 
In this section, I present the details of the study methodology. This section 
includes participants, instrumentation, data type, data collection, data coding, and data 
analyses. Since this study explored journalistic reports surrounding specific events in 




Participant Selection Logic 
Not including magazines, I counted more than 50 daily and weekly NYC news 
outlets in several languages. I studied social construction and normalization about four 
selected radical lone wolf terrorist events in NYC between 2010 and 2017. Therefore, I 
limited my purposive sampling strategy to news outlets meeting four criteria: (a) daily 
reporting, (b) English reporting, (c) large circulation, and (d) established political slant. 
Accordingly, I selected four NYC news outlets (NY Daily News, NY Times, NY Post, Wall 
Street Journal) that had available online content and archival data.  
My rationale for choosing these four news outlets was their circulation and 
diverse political spectrum from liberal to conservative readership. Creswell (2009) 
believed that researchers should use inductive data analyses to build patterns, categories, 
and themes. Creswell advocated that bottom-up data organization moves more abstract 
units of information increasingly, illustrating back and forth between the themes until the 
researchers establish a comprehensive set of themes. Creswell also recommended 
interactive participant collaboration so that participants can shape the themes or 
abstractions. Due to their large circulation and wide political slant (discussed in the next 
section), these news outlets accurately provided the measures necessary to answer the 
central question of this study.  
I accessed these digital news outlets’ stories reflecting the four selected radical 
lone wolf events via their online services. I dissected and analyzed journalistic reports 
evaluating their political alignment and normalization with the assumed readership’s 




and NY Post were the top four NYC news outlets (Agility PR Solutions, 2021; Cision, 
2010; Infoplease, 2007). Only two sources listed circulation, Muck Rack (2018) and 
Infoplease; however, only Infoplease detailed circulation for all four publishers (see 
Figure 1). These findings provided evidence that these news outlets had significantly 
large readership bases. Braun and Clarke (2013) posited that “the most basic definition of 
qualitative research is that it uses words as data collected and analyzed in all sorts of 
ways” (p. 1). I achieved content saturation using my time-bounded parameters, wherein 
authorities apprehended the perpetrators of the four lone wolf terrorist events and 
associated cases concluded. 
Figure 1 
 
News Outlet Circulation 
 
Note. Newspaper circulation adapted from public data (Infoplease, 2007). No permission 
to reprint is needed. 
Substantiating News Outlets’ Political Slant 
Even though the political slant of the four news outlets is commonly accepted, I 
performed a random search through Google for any substantiation of the political 
alignment of the four news outlets: Wall Street Journal, NY Times, NY Post, and NY 
Infoplease, Wall Street 
Journal, 2062312
Infoplease, NY 








Daily News. My goal was to affirm or disaffirm the political slant of each new outlet via 
articles, discussions, or other easily and quickly found internet communication. Search 
results confirmed the political slant of each news outlet. 
NY Times: Liberal 
Five sources listed the NY Times as a liberal NYC newspaper (Allsides, 2020; 
Frost, 2019; Mulshine, 2020; Okrent, 2004; Puglisi, 2006). In two blind bias surveys, 
Allsides found the NY Times consistently reported with a significant left bias. Okrent 
detailed examples of the liberal bias from conservative and liberal perspectives 
throughout 2004. Mulshine pointed out the still-dominant liberal trend in 2020 by 
highlighting the editor’s resignation due to that liberal bias. Thus, between 2004 and 
2020, the NY Times was considered a liberally biased news outlet. Furthermore, Puglisi 
quantitively analyzed NY Times reports between 1946 to 1947 and, controlling for Gallup 
data, found the news outlet was consistently liberally biased. Frost additionally explained 
that the liberal reporting of the NY Times offered coverage of the social justice issues that 
other news outlets did not, which Frost noted were critically important to many citizens. 
NY Daily News: Democratic 
Several sources rated the NY Daily News as a left-leaning newspaper (Allsides, 
2020; Media Bias Fact Check, 2021; Kilinski, 2018; Pressman, 2019). Allsides reported 
that the Daily News had a left media bias. Media Bias Fact Check identified the Daily 
News editorial opinion as highly credible based on its fact-checking history with a left 
learning focus. Five different members of Kilinski noted that the Daily News had left-




left-leaning, the newspaper sounded like Trump 70 years ago, suggesting that the news 
outlet was more right-leaning 2 decades ago than between 2010 and 2017. 
NY Post: Republican 
Multiple sources confirmed that the NY Post was a right-leaning paper (Allsides, 
2020; Caralle, 2020; Concha, 2020; Media Bias Fact Check, 2021; Murphy, 2019). 
Allsides detailed the newspaper’s right-leaning agenda using multi-partisan, scientific 
analysis. Murphy also established the NY Post as a right-leaning bias opinion source 
based on political bias survey questions. Media Bias Fact Check noted the NY Post’s 
targeted right-leaning reading audience. Concha and Caralle’s reports, among others, also 
emphasized the NY Post’s right-leaning political standing and associated endorsements. 
Wall Street Journal: Conservative 
I found numerous sources supporting the Wall Street Journal’s conservative slant 
(Allsides, 2020; Lesemann, 2020; McGee, 2019, Media Bias Fact Check, 2021; 
Weinberg, 2010). Lesemann discussed Wall Street Journal owner Rupert Murdoch’s 
conservative background and associated slant for the business-oriented paper and 
outspoken conservative editorial page. Allsides and Media Bias Fact Check ranked the 
Wall Street Journal as a politically conservative outlet that pushes conservative causes. 
While McGee also posited that the paper was conservative, McGee noted that the Wall 
Street Journal provided fair news clarification. However, Weinberg mentioned that the 
Wall Street Journal’s conservative news spin often conflicted with the liberal reports 





Instrumentation included all aids used in gathering or analyzing data. I used 
software and tools that I own, including NVivo v.12 Plus, Excel, Word, and journals. 
Additionally, I used each news publisher’s website to search for data relating to the four 
lone wolf terrorist events reported between 2010 and 2017. The combination of these 
instruments was adequate to answer the study question. 
• I uploaded and analyzed all data sources using NVivo v.12 Plus, published by 
QSR International. I used an assortment of NVivo’s functionality, including 
coding tools, thematic graphing, and other qualitative analysis tools. 
• I used Office 2019, published by Microsoft (MS), for limited sorting and 
calculation functionality, digital journaling, observations, and analyses. 
• I used a physical notebook for journaling and observations and scanned and 
uploaded data into NVivo v.12 Plus for coding and analyses. 
• Newspaper databases:  
o I accessed the NY Times database via the internet at nytimes.com with a 
student membership.  
o I accessed the NY Daily News database via the internet at 
newyorkdailynews.com with a subscription for unlimited access.  
o I accessed the NY Post database via the internet by uploading the NY Post 
App via Google Play and obtaining a daily/weekly or weekend subscription.  
o I accessed the Wall Street Journal database via the internet at wsj.com with a 




I began the research after obtaining Walden IRB approval (#03-27-0308101). 
After I obtained access to each database, I entered search parameters into the sites’ search 
bars relevant to articles and dates associated with the four radical lone wolf terrorist 
attacks in NYC between 2010 and 2017.  
Secondary Data 
The data for this study consisted of digitally published newspaper articles 
covering the radical lone wolf terrorist attacks in NYC and associated secondary data. 
Secondary data are usually information collected by someone other than the researcher 
(O’Sullivan et al., 2008). According to O’Sullivan et al., secondary data includes data or 
information obtained for other research purposes. The secondary data that I obtained for 
this study informed the comparison of radical lone wolf attacks reported by journalists, 
which provided further meaning behind the variances leading to the normalization of lone 
wolf terrorist activities. That secondary data consisted of journalism commentary, 
opinion pages, and editorial reviews. O’Sullivan et al. posited that “secondary data 
analysis may be necessary if investigators want comparative or longitudinal data” (p. 
271). Since this study covered seven years, this type of secondary data analysis was 
beneficial for the study.  
Due to the time frame of events (between 2010 to 2017), I collected enough data 
to analyze these four cases and meet saturation expectations. Using these data types 
allowed me to view the language and text used, which informed the direction of the news 
report and the political ideology that the author/reporter was trying to convey. In 




use my time more effectively. However, it is possible that sources did not report all the 
information. 
Data Collection Plan 
I collected data using digital newspaper databases to research four radical lone 
wolf terrorist events in NYC. I studied each event on the dates they took place and the 
associated reports published before and after that date in each of the four news outlets. I 
collected all data for this proposed study; no other person assisted me with data 
collection. I repeated searches of the four participant news outlets’ databases as needed, 
and data collection took approximately 3-months (details discussed in Chapter 4). Due to 
the historical nature of this study, I conducted no follow-up data collection.  
I uploaded all data into the qualitative analysis software program, NVivo v.12 
Plus. Maxwell (2013) believed “the basic qualitative analysis methods are memo writing, 
categorizing by themes (coding), and connecting strategies” (p. 105). After uploading the 
articles into NVivo v.12 Plus, I used the program to aid my data extraction from the more 
extensive articles through a system of highlights, marking, tagging, coding, and 
randomization from within the software (details discussed in Chapter 4). The data 
retrieved included data related to the four radical lone wolf attack events in NYC from 
2010 to 2017. To assist in the data collection phase, I utilized a journal detailing the 
strategies and approaches that I implemented to analyze the recorded data. I stored the 
data collected on an encrypted external hard drive to maximize security. After I was 
approved to conduct research, I used the digital newspaper databases to obtain the 





Data analyses included chronological and categorical coding associated with 
political slants in journalistic reporting relating to lone wolf terrorist events. The 
procedure included open coding by looking at those categories that were relevant to the 
central question. Maxwell (2013) deferred to the coding system of Bogden and Bilken 
(2003). Bogden and Bilken posited that “coding strategies are a means of sorting the 
descriptive data you have collected so that the material bearing on a given topic can be 
physically separated from other data” (p. 107). I used these strategies to code the data 
using NVivo v.12 Plus software for analysis assistance. While coding was primarily 
emergent, I began with base codes already established and supported throughout Chapters 
1 and 2 (see Figure 2). The only base codes I used were pre- and post-event, normalizing 
journalism, and politically slanted opinion; the remaining base codes remained empty 
throughout data collection and analyses. Throughout the data analysis process, I 
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Data Analysis Plan 
I analyzed data for themes and patterns after coding them. Then, I used data codes 
in groups (i.e., political, pre-event, post-event, unreported) and in their entirety (all codes 
without exclusion or separation) to generate reports, charts, and graphs using NVivo v.12 
Plus. Next, I used those reports, charts, and graphs for theme identification and pattern 
analyses. Finally, I analyzed the nodes/codes for irregularities, discrepancies, unreported, 
and isolated occurrences using MS Word and Excel. I report all findings, including 
irregularities, discrepancies, unreported, and isolated occurrences in Chapter 4.  
Issues of Trustworthiness 
Trustworthiness in qualitative research is critical to support findings as it 
establishes the reliability and confidence in the study based on the data and methods used 
to create the study (Connelly, 2016; Polit & Beck, 2014). Connelly stated that 
“trustworthiness or rigor of a study refers to the degree of confidence in data, 
interpretation, and methods used to ensure the quality of the study” (p. 435). 
Trustworthiness is vital for the study because it demonstrates the effectiveness of the 
study. I dissected the themes, patterns, and coding system used to explain their meaning 
and ensure that the entirety of the study remained trustworthy. Four key areas that 
established the trustworthiness of this research included the study’s credibility, 
transferability, and dependability of findings, and the confirmability of the entire project 





I ensured the credibility (internal validity) of my study in several ways. 
O’Sullivan et al. (2008) stated that “internal validity refers to the evidence that a specific 
independent variable such as a program, policy, or action, caused by change in an 
observed dependent variable” (p. 58). However, since this was a qualitative study, I was 
not looking at variables but the phenomenon and meaning behind journalistic reporting, 
political slant, and normalization of radical lone wolf events. Thus, I maintained 
credibility by (a) reviewing the information (journalistic reports and secondary data) for 
any distortions/discrepancies that may be relevant to the study, (b) taking copious notes 
to compare with the digital data using a journaling process, and (c) reviewing/updating 
the information as it is made available. In addition, I identified distortions by comparing 
the reported information to the facts of the events. 
Transferability 
Generalizability (the degree to which findings transfer beyond the study 
participants) can be an issue in qualitative research (Maxwell, 2013). Maxwell stated, “a 
key issue for internal generalizability is to adequately understand the variation in the 
phenomenon of interest in the setting or group of people studied” (p. 137). 
Generalizability does not extend beyond NYC, the four news publishers, and the four 
events of this study. Even so, I maintained the study’s transferability (external validity) 
by determining whether other scholars and journalists could replicate the study. In 




individual stories of the participants (Amankwaa, 2016; Connelly, 2016). Connelly stated 
that 
qualitative researchers focus on the informants and their stories without saying 
this is everyone’s story. Researchers support the study’s transferability with a 
rich, detailed description of the context, location, and the people studied and by 
being transparent about analysis and trustworthiness. (p. 436)  
I maintained transferability by detailing the journalists’ stories and being transparent 
about the analyses and trustworthiness.  
Dependability 
The validity/dependability of conclusions depends on their internal 
generalizability (Maxwell, 2013). I maintained validity by considering discrepant 
evidence (negative cases), using triangulation, and incorporating comparison. I 
established dependability by maintaining an audit trail and reviewing my research 
observations throughout the study.  
Confirmability 
I addressed confirmability by conducting an audit trail of the data collection, 
analyses, and data interpretation, as recommended by Connelly (2016) and Polit and 
Beck (2014). Connelly (2016) reported that “confirmability is the neutrality or the degree 
findings are consistent and could be repeated” (p. 435). Thus, I achieved confirmability 
by conducting an audit trail of the data collection, analyses, and data interpretation. 
Additionally, I conformed to the standards required by Walden University by maintaining 





Before conducting my study, I gained approval from Walden University’s 
Institutional Review Board (IRB). I did not include human participants in this research. 
The research required access to journalistic reports published by journalists that 
responded to the four lone wolf attacks in NYC from 2010 to 2017; however, such public 
information did not require permission to use. I adhered to the guidelines provided by 
Walden University regarding ethical standards for dissertations so that I minimized 
unethical practices regarding data collection. In the analysis phase, I maintained 
objectivity by presenting all the data, including discrepant data (reported in Chapter 4). In 
the reporting phase, I refrained from deception and concealment. The IRB approval 
number (#03-27-0308101) validates that Walden University approved the study.  
The primary ethical concerns related to this study pertained to data treatment, 
storage, and researcher bias. My research concerns were deciphering the research 
neutrally without impropriety, bias, or influence. To minimize these concerns, I reviewed 
the information daily and recorded the information in my journal to track my research. 
Data Treatment and Storage 
The digital newspaper articles that I used for this study were open-source 
journalistic printed reports. They were not confidential or anonymous. Nonetheless, I 
stored data extracted from those reports in an encrypted, password-protected, stand-alone 
external drive that only I had access to throughout the research process. Upon request by 
Walden University, I can furnish the information to dissertation committee members, 




that external hard drive. I stored the hard drive and my reflexivity journal in a fire-proof 
bolt-locked safe in my private office, where it will remain for 5-years as required by 
Walden University. After those five years, I will shred the journal, erase all data from the 
hard drive, and reimage the hard drive ensuring the data is unrecoverable. 
Research Dissemination 
I will disseminate research findings to journalists, newspaper publishers, 
politicians, government policymakers, academic scholars, law enforcement organizations, 
and associated publication groups and organizations. Dissemination will be in the form of 
journal articles, informative briefs, and generalized summaries. Since all data sources 
were from publicized journalistic reporting and secondary data, I can provide data sets 
upon request; however, I will maintain data source confidentiality as noted in the data 
treatment and storage section. 
Researcher Bias 
As a retired member of the NYC Police Department and a 9/11 first responder, I 
experienced the impact that terrorism has had on NYC. Subsequently, I possess personal 
views and opinions regarding terrorism and the threat that terrorism poses to U.S. 
National Security. The number of lone wolf and terrorist attacks throughout the United 
States influenced how I view lone wolf terrorists. One of the reasons I chose this topic 
was because of my past experiences. However, I understood how critical it was to remain 
objective throughout the study. Subsequently, I addressed this issue by remaining neutral 
and transparent for future study replication. I maintained my impartiality and neutrality 




direction I needed to take to stay on track with the study and remain focused on the 
central research question. 
Summary 
This phenomenological study provided a more in-depth understanding of how 
socially constructed journalism reports of lone wolf terrorist events in NYC align with 
liberal to conservative political newsprint continuums resulting in the normalization of 
lone wolf activities. A phenomenological study built from social construction theory 
provided the best insight into political journalism reporting and the normalization of lone 
wolf activities. This chapter presented a detailed plan for conducting the proposed 
research study and included an explanation, rationale, and justification for that design. 
Specifically, Chapter 3 included the rationale and justification for the proposed research 
methodology, including (a) the research design and rationale, (b) role of the researcher, 
(c) methodology, (d) participant selection, (e) instrumentation, (f) data collection plan, 
(g) data analysis plan, (h) issues of trustworthiness, and (i) ethical procedures. Chapter 4, 
the results, includes (a) setting, (b) demographics, (c) data collection, (d) data analysis, 
(e) evidence of trustworthiness, and (f) the results. Chapter 5 includes discussion, 




Chapter 4: Results  
I explored news reports of four radical lone wolf events occurring in NYC 
between 2010 and 2017 to determine whether a journalistic, political slant existed 
towards a societal normalization of radical lone wolf behavior aligned with the 
publication source. The central research question was, how are socially constructed 
journalism stories of lone wolf terrorist events in NYC aligning with liberal to 
conservative political newsprint continuums? Chapter 4 includes the (a) setting, (b) 
demographics, (c) data collection, (d) data analysis, (e) evidence of trustworthiness, and 
(f) results of this research study. 
Study Settings 
Due to the 7-year time frame of this study, there were five distinctly different 
settings considering the applicable year; one for each event (four events) and the setting 
during data collection and analyses. I analyzed news outlets’ (Wall Street Journal, NY 
Times, NY Post, NY Daily News) reports about a specific lone wolf terrorist event (Times 
Square Bombing, Port Authority Bombing, Manhattan Bike Path Terrorist, Chelsea 
Bomber). Each event occurred in NYC, and the four data sources (news outlets) ranged 
on the political continuum (left/liberal, center left, center right, right/conservative). The 
varying length of the articles among different media varied as they related to the incidents 
and events. Overall, the NY Post and Daily News articles were shorter and therefore did 
not have as much content as the NY Times and the Wall Street Journal, which resulted in 
less coding, and potentially impacted my thematical analyses. Beyond that similarity, 




(a) the Times Square Bombing, (b) the Port Authority Bombing, (c) the Manhattan Bike 
Path Terrorist, (d) the Chelsea Bomber, and (e) data collection and analysis timeframe. 
Times Square Bombing 
According to the combined reviews of the four news outlets: On May 1, 2010, 
Faisal Shazad, also known as the Times Square Bomber, attempted to detonate a car 
bomb secreted in a Nissan Pathfinder in the middle of NYC’s Times Square. Although 
Shazad left the scene before the attempted detonation, all reports at the time indicated 
Shazad left the vehicle unattended and idling at the location. Amid the smoke emanating 
from the vehicle and the subsequent pedestrian chaos, Shazad’s identity was unknown. A 
street vendor advised the police that the vehicle was smoking and was left unattended. A 
Mounted Unit Police Officer assisted in evacuating the area and advising other units 
about the vehicle. At the time of the event, the media reported Shazad as a suspected lone 
wolf. However, further investigation revealed that Shazad had ties to a faction of the 
Taliban in Pakistan. Authorities apprehended Shazad on a plane at JFK International 
Airport in Queens. There were zero injuries. 
Port Authority Bombing 
According to the combined reviews of the four news outlets: On December 11, 
2017, Akyad Ullah detonated a pipe bomb at approximately 07:20 ET hours in NYC’s 
Port Authority Terminal, injuring four people. Ullah was motivated to detonate the bomb 
after seeing a Christmas poster. Ullah planned to detonate the bomb strategically in a 
high foot traffic area for maximum effect. Before carrying out the event, Ullah rode the 




walkway between two transit hubs. Ullah was apprehended by police immediately at the 
detonation scene and treated at a local hospital for injuries. 
Manhattan Bike Path Terrorist 
According to the combined reviews of the four news outlets: At 15:04 ET, 
Sayfallo Saipov, also known as the Manhattan Bike Path Terrorist, vehicularly struck 
bicyclists on the West Side Highway bike path in NYC, killing eight people. Saipov was 
an Uber driver from Uzbekistan. Saipov lived in New Jersey, rented a truck from a Home 
Depot in Passaic, NJ, and attacked NYC. Saipov drove over a curb on the West Side 
Highway on Halloween Day, intentionally striking the bicyclists, killing eight, and 
injuring 11 people. Shortly after that, Saipov exited the vehicle with two weapons 
resembling authentic firearms: a pellet gun and a paint gun. Saipov was shot by a police 
officer on the scene, apprehended, and taken to an area hospital for gunshot wounds. 
Saipov requested an ISIS flag display outside their hospital room. Additionally, the FBI 
found ISIS rhetoric and videos on Saipov’s cell phone. 
Chelsea Bomber 
According to the combined reviews of the four news outlets: Ahmad Khan 
Rahami, also known as the Chelsea Bomber, detonated one pressure cooker bomb in 
Chelsea on 23rd Street, a pipe bomb in New Jersey at the Marine Corp Charity Run, and 
set a second pressure cooker bomb on 27th Street. The 23rd Street bomb injured 30 people, 
the Marine Corp Charity Run bomb resulted in no injuries, and the 27th Street bomb was 




unidentified; however, authorities apprehended Rahami in New Jersey after exchanging 
gunfire with local police and taken to an area hospital for injuries.  
Data Collection and Analysis 
I collected data from four digital news outlets (NY Times, The Wall Street 
Journal, The NY Post, and the NY Daily News). I analyzed data using NVivo v.12 Plus 
software, creating nodes to probe through journalistic articles about lone wolf terrorist 
events throughout NYC between 2010 and 2017. However, I expanded my search from 
2009 to 2018 to verify that these news outlets had not printed related articles before or 
after that period. Data collection proceeded as planned in Chapter 3, requiring minimal 
deviation considering subscriber comments in the Wall Street Journal. Subsequently, I 
used a random numbers generator to reduce the data to a manageable size, limiting 
subscriber comment data to 100 total comments for the Wall Street Journal. Finally, I 
uploaded the limited subscriber commentary data with the article data and collected and 
analyzed the data as I described in Chapter 3. I made no other deviations in data 
collection.  
While 2020 was a traumatic year, my data analysis plan remained unchanged. 
Data analysis required no deviations; thus, I analyzed data as planned in Chapter 3. I 
remained neutral during the entirety of data collection and analyses. I focused on the 
study and maintained impartiality, thus allowing the research to guide me. I relied on the 
organization and self-discipline strategies presented in Chapter 3 to minimize deviation 




Other Simultaneous Setting-Related Events 
At the same time as the four terrorist events, other news and events were 
happening locally, regionally, nationally, and globally that the news outlets would have 
all had an equal interest in reporting. Thus, given the simultaneous nature of the drive to 
report newsworthy events, the lone wolf events in one or more of the published sources 
may have taken up more column inches than other events. That deviation may have 
fluctuated over time based on the sequencing of capture, trial, and conviction. Thus, I 
include a synopsis of simultaneous events occurring in tandem with the four terrorist 
events noted in this section. 
Times Square Bombing 
It is my experience that, during the holiday month of December, the NYPD has 
extra officers seasonally posted for omnipresence and to deter crimes due to holiday 
shopping. Additionally, NYC has tourists filling the streets for the holiday Christmas 
shows (like the Radio City Music Hall Rockettes, A Christmas Carol, and Home for the 
Holidays; Mandell, 2017). These types of shows bring population surge into the city (The 
Broadway League, n.d.). Although this terrorist event occurred in the morning, there was 
a substantial holiday rush and energy throughout the city (Mandell, 2017). This seasonal 
populace increase resulted in an expanded police presence and the volume of people 
using the subways during morning rush hour. Reporters may have been influenced by 
wanting to quickly report the event and the quick work of the officers. The holiday 
affected all news outlets; therefore, any data taint would have tainted all data uniformly, 




Port Authority Bombing 
In the spring of 2010, the U.S. economy improved after the great recession of 
2008 (Cox, 2010). The NY unemployment rate was 10.6%, and the employment-
population ratio was 57.1 (U.S. Bureau of Labor and Statistics, 2011). Hungary came out 
of recession, and Finland fell back into recession (OnThisDay, n.d.). Notable events 
included the Gaza Flotilla raid; various sports events; the Kentucky Derby; the 
Indianapolis 500; the demolition of the Yankee Stadium; a train derailing in Merano, 
Italy; the eruption of the Icelandic volcano, Eyjafjallajökull; the Country Music and Tony 
Awards; the 114th Boston Marathon; and the release of Iron Man II and Toy Story III 
(OnThisDay, n.d.). Despite these other world events generating news-worthy journalism, 
the NYC local and U.S. national news media tone centered on the hunt for who was 
responsible and why it happened. 
Manhattan Bike Path Terrorist 
On Tuesday, October 31, 2017, the weather was cold, with a high of 52 and a low 
of 46 degrees Fahrenheit (Timeanddate.com, n.d.). The annual Halloween Village Parade 
was scheduled that evening on Sixth Avenue from Broome Street to 16th Street (NYC 
Insider Guide, n.d.), and NYC’s Pay History Ban Bill took effect that day (Ayala, 2017). 
Due to Halloween activities, reporters typically continuously report activities throughout 
the city to advise people on events or travel safety. Media attention focused on the new 
bill immediately before the attack. However, all news outlets were likely affected 
similarly. Thus, I decided that these activities would have an equal influence on all news 





Saturday, September 17, 2016, was the beginning of Oktoberfest in NYC on Pier 
15 (Bottles, 2016). NY University (2016) was also hosting its Health Sciences 
Symposium in lower Manhattan. Although the bombing in Chelsea took place at 20:30 
ET, a similar bomb detonated earlier that morning in Seaside Park, NJ (U.S. Department 
of Justice [DOJ], 2017). Since the unidentified perpetrator was at large and connections 
between the bombings were unknown, citizens may have been anxious and reporters 
over-zealous in their reporting. However, like the Port Authority Bombing and Bike Path 
Terrorist, all media outlets would have likely been equally affected. Thus, while the 
events probably influenced the data, that influence would have been uniform; therefore, I 
deemed the data acceptable. 
During Data Collection and Analyses 
Several events and issues impacted 2020, such as the presidential election, the 
COVID-19 pandemic, and the George Floyd and Black Lives Matter protests, which 
significantly aggravated local, national, and world tensions. Nevertheless, throughout 
data collection and analyses, I strictly adhered to my data collection and analysis plan, 
thereby remaining focused and well-organized despite the high stress and uncertainty of 
the environment. Therefore, I deemed that the stressful environment did not affect data 
collection or analyses during this study. 
Demographics 
Four prominent publications reported the news in NYC and the surrounding 




served as my archival data sources. These four publications range in their journalistic, 
political spectrum from liberal to conservative (see Table 1). In addition, the number of 
subscribers and average article length were significant demographic factors contributing 




Participant Political slant Subscribers Avg. lone wolf article length 
NY Times  Left-leaning - liberal  1,120,420 860 words 
NY Daily News Left-leaning - Democrat 718,174 270 words 
Wall Street Journal Right-leaning - conservative 2,062,312 900 words 
NY Post Right-leaning - Republican 724,748 350 words 
Note. Newspaper circulation adapted from public data (Infoplease, 2007). 
 
Data Collection 
I began data collection on April 10, 2020, after receiving IRB approval (#03-27-
0308101) on March 27, 2020, and continued through October 30, 2020, when I 
completed coding the data material. The data collected included all digital print published 
by each newspaper relating to each of four reported lone wolf terrorist events between 
2010 and 2017 in NYC. The events occurred within the confines of NYC, with one of the 
events extending into New Jersey and ending in gunfire exchange between the perpetrator 
and the police. I conducted a digital search for journalistic stories, editorials, 
commentaries, opinions, and subscriber responses printed surrounding the four events for 
each event. I also extended my search parameter using Firefox and Google from 2009 to 
2018 in each publication to see if prior and post stories, editorials, commentaries, 




Search terms included comments, opinions, editorials, variations of each lone wolves’ 
name - Ahmad Khan Rahami, Sayfallo Saipov, Faisal Shazad, Akyad Ullah, event dates, 
locations, terror, terrorist, attack, lone wolf,  radical, hate, violence, and kill. Boolean 
combinations connected the keywords in the search engine fields. I then uploaded those 
data using NVivo v.12 Plus software in PDF and MS Word formats with one variation: 
The Wall Street Journal.  
Due to the extensive article comments and quantity published by the Wall Street 
Journal (+ 1,000 comments), I used a random numbers table (numbergenerator.org) to 
reduce the data quantity to a manageable size. Using the random numbers table, I selected 
100 random data file comments, from the original 1,000+ comments, for coding outside 
of the 182 published articles. I then uploaded these 100 comment files into NVivo v.12 
Plus with the 182 articles in the same manner as the data from the other three newspapers 
and proceeded uniformly from there. I stored all data digitally on a password-protected 
hard drive. I will keep the hard drive and my reflexive journal secured in a fire-proof 
bolt-locked safe in my office for the required 5-year retention period before data 
destruction. 
Next, I analyzed and dissected the data assigning nodes/codes beginning with the 
pre-established codes (see Figure 2) and developed additional nodes/codes as needed. 
Because the NY Post and the Daily News articles contained more graphic than literary 
content, I coded the associated captions in the same manner that I coded the written data 
for the NY Times and the Wall Street Journal, sentence by sentence, paragraph by 




node/codes list. I then used Axial coding to pinpoint links and likenesses between the 
nodes and printed articles. After dissecting all data, I analyzed the nodes/codes for the 




Final Data Node-sets 
 
Pre-Event
Law Lottery Law Program
Federal Election 
Laws
Green Card Getting Green Cars
Green Card 
Program
Lottery VISA or VISA Lottery Lottery Law Lottery Bill
Green Card 
Lottery
















After I coded and analyzed each digital newspaper separately to extrapolate the 
data inductively, I scrutinized the data for consistency, repetition, and quantity to 
progress from nodes/coded units to more prominent representations to identify themes, 
patterns, and trends. I reviewed the coded data several times, analyzing for consistency, 
repetition, and word severity to increase trustworthiness. After ensuring data 
trustworthiness, I analyzed the data for themes and trends. 
I used the base codes as category groupings to help identify themes and patterns 
(see Figure 4). I used the political alignment group to identify and support the political 
slant of each news outlet, which aligned and supported my demographic findings (see 
Table 1). I used the pre-event grouping to code data reported before the event occurred 
but still related to the event. Albeit, because of the significance of the node to the study 
question, I separated the normalizing journalism node into a separate category, which 
subsequently developed codes within that node (see Figure 3). I used the post-event 
grouping similarly; however, the amount and types of data in the node substantiated 
subcodes and separate categories supporting further theme analyses. I removed the four 
base codes that contained no data: predictor, reflective, critical, and unreported. After in-
depth node group organization, 13 distinct groupings emerged (see Figure 4). Due to the 
minimal data in pre-event, law, and green card, I removed those nodes from analyses. 
Upon reviewing each remaining node, I also removed green card, lottery, and other 
laws/policies because I deemed those nodes irrelevant to my research question. Thus, I 




opinion policy-related, politically slanted opinion, post-event, normalizing journalism, 
radicalization, terrorism, lone wolf, and terror. Even though lone wolf contained minimal 




Total Data Coded per Node-set 
 
Node Descriptions 
This section describes the data type within the correlating node and lists any sub-
nodes or offspring of correlating nodes. I included these descriptions to (a) delineate the 
node content, (b) differentiate the difference between similarly titled nodes, and (c) 
establish the nature of each node and node family. 
Lone wolf: Any content mentioned or using the term lone wolf or inference that 































Normalizing journalism: Data that demonstrated normalizing language that, 
according to Berger and Luckmann’s (1966) social construction theory, influenced social 
construction and one’s response to the same. Organizational subcodes in this node 
included terrorist and terrorist groups. 
Political opinion policy-related: Word groupings within a sentence or paragraph 
that described policy-orientated political opinions. 
Politically slanted opinion: Event-oriented, politically slanted opinion. 
Post-event: Content reported after the attacks occurred, during crime scene 
investigation, and any relevant information reported after the time of the attacks (i.e., 
court arraignment, court indictment, and other event references). Organizational subcodes 
developed due to the frequency-specific words and included kill, hate, rhetoric, violence, 
and attacks. 
Radicalization: Data related to radicalization before and after attacks aligned with 
Borum’s (2012a) four stage pathway mindset model of terrorism constructs. 
Terror: Data characterizing, emphasizing, or resembling journalistic 
sensationalism directed at heightening subscribers’ emotions of fear, panic, or terror. 
Terrorism: Content aligned with the definition of an act of terror in which force 
was used without permission or authority against a person or things. 
Emerging Themes and Patterns 
This section presents details, descriptions, and rationale of the patterns and 
themes that emerged during data analyses. After organizing nodes and node families, I 




reporting practices influence social construction. By analyzing these data relative to their 
events, I found that this influence aligned to each event in all four news outlets. These 
patterns and themes delineated distinct differences, denoting a consistent political 
continuum slant aligned with corresponding newspaper readership. Due to the significant 
amount of data in the associated nodes, the three themes became a focal point of my 
trustworthiness analyses. By further reviewing the coded data visually via a combination 
of text content and graphic configurations generated via NVivo v.12 Plus functionality, I 
established that one node-set (post event) and three distinct themes were universally 
associated with all four new outlets: normalizing journalism, political slant, and terror 
tactics (see Figure 5). 
Figure 5 
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Pattern: Post Coverage 
The substantial amount of data in the post-event grouping immediately drew my 
attention. Even after separating and organizing the data, the pattern depicted by that node 
was significant throughout data analyses. With 11,205 combined data coded to post-
event, I was unsurprised that the post-event node permeated all four news outlets. The 
subordinate nodes in this node-set included kill, hate, rhetoric, violence, and attacks due 
to their excessive frequency (see Figure 6). The quantity of data in this node-set indicated 
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The normalization theme emerged from the normalizing journalism node family, 
including the terrorist and terrorist group nodes (see Figure 7). With 6,551 data coded to 
normalization, I was also not surprised to find this node throughout the news outlets. For 
example, in the NY Times, Byman (2018) stated that: 
… in terrorism, we may remember 2018 for what didn’t happen: The jihadists 
threat to the United States has dissipated. We only had one death for jihadist 
linked terrorism in this country, and while disturbing, it was hardly an Islamic 
State spectacular. (In Florida, a teenage boy, inspired by jihadist videos, stabbed a 
thirteen-year-old friend to death during a sleepover). (p. 1) 
Byman’s statement demonstrated how this news outlet attempted to minimize terrorist 
acts; thus, normalizing terrorism to construct society described by Berger and Luckmann 
(1966). Although Byman only discussed one lone wolf event death, that report seemed to 
ignore the overall total terrorist events that occurred. For example, Quinn (2016) found 
that, 
Since 1975, there have been 236 terror-related events within the 5 boroughs of 
New York City. These events include overt attacks (both executed and 
attempted), foiled plots, and activity found to be providing direct support to 
terrorist groups. Of these events, 189 were successful attacks (or action related to 
a successful attack), 35 were attacks that did not succeed (bomb failed to 
detonate, device discovered and disarmed, etc.), and 12 were plots effectively 




Quinn’s analysis provided insight from 1975 to 2016 about NYC as a terrorist target and 
terrorism normalization framing in contrast to Byman’s isolated report. Thus, I 
determined that Byman purposefully slanted the article to minimize the terrorist 
terroristic nature of the event. The substantial amount of data coded to normalizing 
journalism indicated that news outlets do significantly socially construct society. 
Figure 7 
 
Normalizing Journalism Node-set 
  
Theme: Political Slant 
The political slant theme emerged from the two nodes: political opinion policy-
related and politically slanted opinion (see Figure 8). Political slant was apparent 
throughout every newspaper outlet, as demonstrated by the two political slant nodes. For 
example, an article coded to both political slant nodes (policy-oriented and event-
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Presidential reactions to the terrorist attack in NY City and how the President would 
approach the immigration ties to Muslim Nations. Thrall (2016) cited: 
Trump's tough talk feels good when emotions are running high, and in the 
aftermath of a terrorist attack, Trump's calls to use profiling, to halt immigration 
from Muslim-dominated nations, and to increase police surveillance on Muslim 
neighborhoods sound reasonable to many people. Trump's son, Donald Trump, 
Jr., probably summed up how many people feel about the threat posed by refugees 
and immigrants when he compared it to a bowl of Skittles. If he had a bowl of 
Skittles and three of them were deadly, he asked on Twitter, would you take a 
handful? (p. 2)  
The political slant in Thrall’s article used the terrorist attack to tie in immigration law, 
thereby slanting the fear generated by the attack to connect immigration as a presumptive 
cause and avenue to allowing terrorists into the United States. Following Berger and 
Luckmann (1966), this type of persuasion creates a societal normalization. In this case, 
reports correlated terrorism with immigration to further the news outlet's political stance, 






Political Slant Grouping 
 
Terror Tactics 
The terror tactics theme emerged in several sensationalizing nodes, including 
terrorist, terrorist groups, radicalization, terrorism, lone wolf, and terror (see Figure 9). 
Beckett (2008), Bilgen (2012), Doward (2015), Malia (2013), Nieto (2016), Picard 
(1989), and White (2020), among others, demonstrated the part that terrorizing 
sensationalism plays in the tactics of terrorism. Thus, I decided to call this theme terror 
tactics because the articles were written and publicized tactically by the news outlets to 
disseminate their stories about the terrorist events. This theme included all codes related 
to terror and indicated a robust social construct based on manipulating societal terror 
through sensationalizing, capitalizing, or otherwise overly exaggerating or manipulating 
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Terror Tactics Grouping 
 
The terror tactic theme was surprisingly as significant as political slant (see 
Figures 8 and 9), and all news outlets employed terror tactics. Interestingly, examples of 
both extremes were evident. The NY Times (Byman, 2018) downplayed terrorism while 
other news outlets capitalized on terrorism to slant their agendas. This theme 
demonstrated developing societal constructs by depicting and slanting terrorism to sway 
and normalize patrons to the journalist’s or publication’s political continuum viewpoint. 
Berger and Luckmann (1996) posited that “knowledge is socially distributed, and the 
mechanism of this distribution can be made the subject matter of a sociological 
discipline” (p. 28). For example, Schram et al. (2016) sensationalized terrifying opinions 
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constructs. Schram et al. wrote that “a 28-year-old man hunted in connection with bomb 
blasts in Manhattan and New Jersey … after shooting two cops … found snoozing in a 
bar vestibule” (p. 1). Schram et al. used descriptive words such as hunted, bomb blasts, 
shooting cops, and snoozing excessively throughout their article. These words helped 
create a readers’ visualization concerning a lone wolf’s character type and the types of 
behaviors they likely display, such as hunter, bomber, snoozer (lazy). In the same article, 
Schram et al. also emphasized peoples’ fears of terror cells, their multiple locations, 
terrorist ideology, and linkages to other shootings, which may or may not have been 
terror-related. Schram et al. capitalized on the New Jersey Mayor’s statement that: 
I am extremely concerned for the residents of the community, but more 
importantly extremely concerned for everyone in the state and country where 
someone can just go and drop a backpack into a garage can that has explosives in 
it. (p. 6) 
Schram et al.’s excessive use of fear and terror-inspiring words paired with similar, and 
sometimes unrelated, details from other events created and normalized the Chelsea 
bombing. Schram et al. used terroristic sensationalism and reporting according to their 
desired social construct and that of their right-leaning publication source. Schram et al.’s 
article was one of many I found providing an example wherein journalists employed 





Evidence of Trustworthiness 
My trustworthiness check encompassed all strategies listed in Chapter 3, which 
addressed trustworthiness through triangulation, comparison, consistency, and 
duplication. In addition to validating the three major emergent themes, I used the 
processes outlined in Chapter 3 to establish trustworthiness and conducted an article 
comparison for clarification. I read articles individually for conciseness and 
interpretation, finding no apparent irregularities. I also included a thorough description of 
all my research findings. I encountered no instances wherein trustworthiness verification 
required deviation from the processes described in Chapter 3. Thus, I established the 
credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability of my results by verifying 
the evidence of each news outlet’s trustworthiness. 
Wall Street Journal Trustworthiness 
According to their website (https://www.wsj.com/about-us?mod=wsjfooter), the 
Wall Street Journal adheres to a set of newsroom standards and ethical guidelines to 
accredit the news stories they publish. Those posted standards included: 
• The Wall Street Journal is trusted by readers because 
• Readers view the stories as accurate and impartial.  
• Wall Street Journal reporters abide by the Dow Jones Code of Conduct. 
However, the Wall Street Journal did not post any measures for oversight, vetting, or 
fact-checking. Nor did the Wall Street Journal note the process by which stories get 




NY Times Trustworthiness 
The New York Times reported that it holds its reporters accountable and 
maintains transparency about the standards that its reporters must adhere to 
(https://www.wsj.com/about-us?mod=wsjfooter; nytco.com/journalism/). In addition, the 
NY Times listed several guides for its personnel: 
• Ethical Journalism Guidebook,  
• Guidelines for Reader Comments,  
• Guidelines on Our Integrity,  
• Editorial Standards for NYT Live,  
• Social Media Guidelines for the Newsroom, and  
• Advertising Acceptability Guidelines. 
The New York Times also mentioned that their journalism opinion department consisted 
of experts in their field. However, like the Wall Street Journal, the NY Times did not 
include how their stories were accredited, sources validated, oversight management, and 
the vetting process. 
NY Daily News Trustworthiness 
Tribune Publishing owns the New York Daily News and a conglomerate of news 
outlets throughout the United States (Chicago Tribune, New York Daily News, The 
Baltimore Sun, Orlando Sentinel, South Florida Sun-Sentinel, Daily Press, Hartford 
Courant, The Morning Call, & The Virginia Pilot; Investor.tribpub.com/static-
files/e0227e90-9f9d-46f0-b264-d00412a37919). The Tribune Publishing Company does 




Tribune Publishing did list a code of ethics and business conduct guidebook for its 
personnel (Tribpub.com/#whoare we). While the NY Daily News journalism department 
is not explicitly listed in that guidebook (nor are the other news outlets), the ethical 
practices and integrity policies applicable to all their news outlet holdings address: 
• Conflicts of interest,  
• Gifts & entertainment,  
• Respecting employee privacy.  
I also found an outside source validating the trustworthiness of the NY Daily 
News: iMediaEthics (Imediaethics.org/who-are-anonymous-sources-that-used-ny-daily-
news-to-attack-fdny-chief-leonard). Smith (2018) wrote about the New York Daily News 
editor’s statement that:  
The NYDN policy in anonymous sources calls for two or more people with direct 
knowledge of the subject or first-person observations of actions or events who 
can’t speak publicly without risk to their personal safety or continued 
employment. We also evaluate the source’s motivations and any potential benefit 
possible derived from publication. The New York Daily News does not discuss its 
sources.” (n/a) 
Like the Wall Street Journal and NY Times, the NY Daily News website did not identify 
the story, source, oversight, or vetting credibility or validation. 
NY Post Trustworthiness 
An extensive internet search using Google Chrome and Firefox revealed no 




investigation of the NY Post’s website provided no information about the NY Post’s 
story accreditation, source validation, oversight, or vetting practices. Boolean 
combinations used on all three search sources (Google, Firefox, NY Post) included NY 
Post, ethical standards, guidelines, Ethics, fact check, and other variations of How does 
the New York Post validate their stories? 
Overall News Outlet Trustworthiness 
The search for news outlet trustworthiness for all four news outlets was long, 
tedious, and resulted in zero verifiable trustworthiness verification. Only Tribune 
Publishing, which owns NY Daily News, had any documented trustworthiness processes, 
and those documents (a) did not specify the NY Daily News or (b) include anything 
about story credibility, source validation, oversight, or vetting. Thus, I cannot verify the 
trustworthiness of any of the four news outlets. While this lack of data does not support 
the news outlets’ trustworthiness, it does confirm that there was ample opportunity for 
each news outlet to construct reality according to their whims without risk of 
repercussion. 
Credibility of Results 
My journalism reports and secondary data evaluations revealed no data 
misrepresentations pertinent to the study as all journaling notes, digital data, and analyses 
aligned. Triangulation with the printed stories (newspaper checking) aligned with each 
other and the themes that emerged. For example, I cross-referenced the four news outlets’ 




and why the events occurred. This process helped to create an idea about the sequence 
events and cross-reference the reporting. 
Transferability of Results 
I corroborated the printed stories with triangulation and news outlet checking to 
support transferability through transparency. Transparency was evident through my 
finding’s description and inclusion of discrepancies and variations reported. One of those 
variations included the excessive data reported by the Wall Street Journal, wherein I 
noted my use of the random numbers generator to reduce the amount of data I analyzed 
from that source due to excessive subscriber commentary. In addition, I reported the 
graphical and text variances between the news outlets and how I handled deviations. 
Dependability of Results 
To maintain dependability, I reviewed the data promulgated by NVivo v.12 Plus 
for accuracy. My audit trail aligned with my journal observations and accuracy check, 
which provided evidence of dependability. This dependability became apparent as I 
reviewed each printed news article and cross-referenced the news reports of the four 
news outlets. Therefore, I cross-referenced each of the cases reported, the Times Square 
Bombing, the Port Authority Bombing, the Manhattan Bike Path Terrorist, and the 
Chelsea Bomber. 
Confirmability of Results 
I established confirmability using my data collection audit trail in conjunction 
with analyses and interpretation to ensure my neutrality and consistency. I continually 




and strove for the highest standards of integrity, ethical principles, and transparency. I 
randomly and periodically confirmed my results against the source data's actual articles 
to confirm alignment. 
Study Results 
These results address the research question of how journalism stories relating to 
lone wolf terrorist events in NYC socially constructed society in alignment with liberal to 
conservative political newsprint continuums. In all four events, the perpetrators were 
captured and sentenced. Additionally, all newspaper outlets confirmed and reported 
similar event execution methods of these terrorist attacks. However, the longevity and 
slant used to report the events were different. These differences were visible through the 
content, style, and analyses of each news outlet's reports. 
I noted some interesting reporting inconsistencies between the news outlets (see 
Figure 10). For example, in all but one area (post-event), the Wall Street Journal reported 
the most data. The NY Post consistently reported the least data quantity. Of all their 
reports, the NY Post was the only news outlet that included more normalizing journalism 






Data Quantity Comparison Between Media Sources 
 
While post-event reporting and normalizing commentary were the two most 
prevalent reporting trends, only the Wall Street Journal and the NY Times reported 
politically slanted opinion as their third most heavily engaged social construction 
reporting. The NY Post and the NY Daily News used terror as their third most social 
construction influencer. Thus, the Republican (NY Post) and Democrat (NY Daily News) 
outlets used more terror to influence social construction. In contrast, the liberal (NY 
Times) and conservative (Wall Street Journal) outlets used more political opinion to 
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Wall Street Journal: Conservative 
I uploaded and coded 182 articles (in addition to 100 subscriber comments) from 
the Wall Street Journal; albeit, the Wall Street Journal had more content in their articles, 
commentary from subscribers, and opinions than the other news outlets. The overall tone 
and reporting style of the Wall Street Journal emphasized and accentuated the terrorist 
theme, as Figure 11 demonstrates with a large amount of data in the terrorist, terrorist 
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Since the number of articles coded was consistent with the other news outlets, I 
attributed the increased amount of Wall Street Journal data to the length of their articles, 
the reporters’ writing styles, and detailed event descriptions. The Wall Street Journal 
includes their 38 Pulitzer Prizes awards for having a 2.5 million readership base 
(wsj.com); that substantial patronage could be why the Wall Street Journal had excessive 
commentary sections. However, these data trends were abundant in most Wall Street 
Journal articles coded, including those with minimal subscriber commentary. For 
example, Shallwani et al.’s (2016) summary of the attack by Rahami included words and 
phrases like terror, lone wolves, and terror groups at the beginning of the story and 
repeatedly continued through the end. By mentioning the Rahami case and other attacks 
in the story, the writers sensationalized fear creating a social construct that terrorism is an 
overwhelming issue in the U.S. Shallwani et al. wrote that: 
… three violent attacks over the weekend that left almost 40 people injured 
remained shrouded in questions, but together they fueled growing fears among 
authorities about terror assaults by small groups, lone wolves, or simply deranged 
individuals. And even as those were under investigation, a suspicious device 
found in a trash can near a train station in Elizabeth, N.J., exploded early Monday 
as a bomb squad was attempting to disarm it with a robot, officials said, according 
to the Associated Press. (p. 1) 
I found this same longevity and style throughout the Wall Street Journal’s reporting of all 




The Wall Street Journal also had a higher rate of stories involving political slant 
(4,868), demonstrating the publication’s significant propensity to normalize social 
constructs politically and alongside a conservative base. Normalizing journalism codes 
were also substantial (3,439), indicating that the Wall Street Journal incorporated social 
constructs to the news outlets’ desired view, further driving the normalization of those 
social constructs. Considering the terror tactics, political slant, and normalization 
practices (see Figures 10 & 11), the Wall Street Journal substantially constructed society 
and normalized those constructs. The Wall Street Journal used terror to frame scenarios 
by consistently using terrorizing sensationalism surrounding terror, terrorism, terrorist 
group, radicalization, lone wolf, and terrorist. 
Overall, based on that article, the Wall Street Journal’s content and the descriptive 
terminology accentuated the severity of the terrorist attacks and appealed to conservative 
readers’ emotions to highlight and strengthen political rhetoric. However, considering 
Berger and Luckman’s (1966) statement that “an understanding of language is thus 
essential for understanding of everyday life” (p. 52), the Wall Street Journal significantly 
constructed social norms around terror during the events I investigated. According to 
Berger and Luckman, such language impacts the ideas and perceptions of the populace, 
which, in this case, led to heightened terrorism fear aimed at forwarding a political 
agenda. Thus, I found that the Wall Street Journal contained significant terror tactics, 




NY Times: Liberal 
Even though I coded more articles from the NY Times than the Wall Street 
Journal, the content and writing style of the NY Times was not as elaborate. Additionally, 
while subscribers contributed comments more frequently in the Wall Street Journal, the 
NY Times included substantially more editorial comments on the terrorist events. 
Subsequently, the replication of redundant data reported was far less in the NY Times, 
and the data I extracted pertained to a broader range of nodes (see Figure 12).  
Figure 12 
 
New York Times Directly Coded References 
 
For example, similar stories in the Wall Street Journal and NY Times about 
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Times. The stark data content difference indicated reporting differences; Specifically, the 
NY Times content contained minimal slant or opinion. Furthermore, when analyzing 
similar stories like I did the Shazad case, I realized the NY Times highlighted extensive 
data such as Shazad’s connections to the militant group Tehrik-i-Taliban. The NY Times 
also detailed Shazad’s meeting with the Pakistani Taliban leader, Hakimullah Mehsud, 
and ongoing contact with Mehsud upon Shazad’s return to the United States. 
Most NY Times articles included extensive data providing more information with 
significantly less political slant than the Wall Street Journal. For example, Elliot (2010) 
provided an in-depth look at the event sequence leading to Shazad’s radicalization attack 
and clarified where Shazad learned about explosives. These details were essential 
because they pointed out and identified Shazad’s ties to the Tehrik-e-Taliban, thus 
debunking prior reports that Shazad was a lone wolf. Based on Elliot’s report, Shazad 
also gained training and support from the Tehrik-e-Taliban. Aligning Elliot’s detail and 
writing style with Berger and Luckmann’s (1966) theory of social construction, I found 
far less inflammatory normalization than other news outlets. 
Furthermore, Elliot (2010) depicted a militant group with ties to Shazad. Shazad’s 
radicalization and subsequent attack aligned with Borum’s (2012a) model. Considering 
Berger and Luckman's (1966) social construct theory, Elliot’s straightforward, non-
inflammatory language furthered a social construction depicting what terrorists go 
through before an attack. Elliot implied that other terrorists and U.S. residents could have 
the same terroristic dedication and training but did not confirm such. Thus, I found that 




to or connected to the terrorist as did the Wall Street Journal. In addition, NY Times’ 
political slant usage was significantly less frequent than the Wall Street Journal. The NY 
Times used normalizing terminology slightly more than the Wall Street Journal. 
However, that normalization did not involve terror tactics or political slant as profoundly 
as the Wall Street Journal. Thus, I found that the NY Times used some terror tactics, 
political slant, and normalization to construct society. 
The NY Post: Republican 
I uploaded and coded 188 articles for the NY Post. The NY Post had more 
sensational stories with photos and less subscriber commentary than the NY Times and 
the Wall Street Journal. The NY Post contained short, poignant stories with minimal data 
per article, reflected by the small data amount in the various nodes (see Figures 5 – 10, & 
13). Considering Berger and Luckmann’s (1966) theory, the NY Post rarely normalized 
social constructs. Like the Wall Street Journal, the NY Post used sensationalizing terror 
tactics and political slant. The NY Post employed the same themes as the other three 
news outlets but used these themes less frequently (see Figure 5). Even so, the NY Post 






New York Post Directly Coded References 
 
As demonstrated by the significant data in the terror code, the NY Post tactically 
capitalized on the readers’ terror, using sensational language to capture readers’ attention. 
For example, Celona et al. (2016) used phrases like “deafening explosion,” “blew out 
scores of windows,” “high powered explosive,” and “sudden flash of white light” to 
sensationalize the news article by offering descriptive phrases meant to appeal to the 
senses and offer event imagery. The article had five photos, including one showing a 
mangled dumpster at the site of the explosion. In addition, Celona et al. wrote, “hundreds 
of people, including neighbors trying to get to their cars or apartments, milled around 
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tactic sensationalism creates social constructs about terrorism. Even so, Celona et al.’s 
terror tactics did not normalize those social constructs. 
Many NY Post stories were socially constructive, depicting terrorist traits, 
including familial extremism. For example, Sperry (2016) briefly discussed the hatred 
that Rahami held for America, the planning Rahami exhibited before detonating the 
explosives, and details of other terrorist events wherein the family contributed in some 
way to the attack. While not a normalizing social construct, Sperry (2016) reported about 
the family and the attacker's actions before the attack. In doing so, Sperry incorporated 
Rahami’s family within the social construct, raising questions about the attacker’s actions 
before the attack and whether there was a nexus in behavior to other lone wolf attackers 
or prior attacks. The anger and hatred for America, as espoused by Rahami and 
potentially his family, aligned with Stage 1 of Borum’s (2012a) four-stage pathway 
mindset model of terrorism in that “the grievance stage is where the individual criticizes 
their social condition and environment as being uninviting” (p. 604). 
Overall, I found that the NY Post reported the four events in a short, concise 
manner with limited slant and normalizing language but did use sensationalizing terror 
tactics to construct the events socially. The NY Post accentuated the severity of the 
events by using sensational language that aligned with the terror tactics theme. The NY 
Post followed the events through the judicial process as well. It included information not 
found in the other news outlets, like Sperry’s (2016) report on the Rahami family social 




The NY Daily News: Democratic 
I uploaded and coded 239 articles from the NY Daily News: More content than 
the other news outlets but with the shortest average word count (n = 270 words). Thus, 
the NY Daily News’ coded references were equivalent to the NY Post, contained similar 
sensationalism, and included opinion and commentary columns. However, the NY Daily 
News’ content contained more political slant, sensationalizing terror tactics, and 
normalization than the NY Post (see Figures 5, 10, 13, & 14).  
Figure 14 
 
New York Daily News Directly Coded References 
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Combining the political slant and normalization with the terror tactics, the NY Daily 
News also socially constructed and normalized society. For example, Silverstein (2016) 
wrote a story about how Rahami learned bomb-making and acquired skills from an Al 
Qaeda magazine and detailed Rahami’s apparent ties to an Afghan Taliban seminary. 
Silverstein explained the pending charges and crimes leading to Rahami’s arrest using 
policy and politically slanted verbiage: 
The Department of Homeland Security memo shows that the bombs Rahami 
allegedly left in four locations — two in New York's Chelsea neighborhood, and 
two in his home state of New Jersey — were all made differently from each other. 
But all of the bombs followed guidelines spelled out in issues of Inspire, the terror 
group's in-house magazine… The memo shows yet another instance of Rahami 
apparently taking tips from terrorists abroad. He praised Osama Bin Laden, Al 
Qaeda and ISIS in a blood-soaked journal that was found after his arrest. The 
Guardian reported that, during a 2011 trip to Pakistan, he spent three weeks at a 
religious seminary tied to the Afghan Taliban. Authorities have not found 
evidence of Rahami having direct ties to any terror groups... He faces state 
charges for the gunfight, and a criminal complaint showed he will also face 
several federal charges, including using weapons of mass destruction and 
bombing a place of public use. 
These examples present a tie to policy and politics present in Silverstein’s story, thereby 
demonstrating how slanted verbiage and literary content drew attention to policy while 




The significant amount of data in the NY Daily News’ hate/rhetoric/violence, 
attacks, and kill codes demonstrate considerable normalizing social construction (see 
Figure 14). The verbiage revealed an alignment between the language and the social 
constructs developed, bringing attention to the terrorist event and normalizing fear 
perceptions related to terrorist events. According to Berger and Luckmann (1966):  
The sociology of knowledge must concern itself with whatever passes for 
knowledge in a society, regardless of the ultimate validity or invalidity of such 
knowledge. And in so far as all human knowledge is developed, transmitted, and 
maintained in social situations, the sociology of knowledge must seek to 
understand the processes by which this is done in such a way that a taken for 
granted reality congeals for the man in the street. In other words, we contend that 
sociology of knowledge is concerned with the analysis of the social construction 
of reality. (p. 15) 
Berger and Luckmann’s analysis pertained to this normalizing construct because it 
demonstrated how individuals process knowledge and validate the information. The 
social constructs presented in the NY Daily News stories consist of communication and 
language that set the tone for what individuals perceived as reality; thus, normalizing that 
social construct. Overall, I found that the NY Daily News reported politically slanted 
stories to enhance political policy and opinion and had a consistent pattern of normalizing 





Throughout this study, I found that news outlets normalized social constructs 
alongside the political continuum of the newspaper’s reading audience across these four 
lone wolf terrorist events in NYC. All four news outlets possessed a unique reporting 
style, including commentary and opinion, about the four terrorist events. Equally notable 
was that each news outlet had a diverse way of reporting terrorist events accentuating 
different views, which aligned with the context of the research question. While all four 
news outlets’ content was primarily post-event, three distinct themes emerged: Terror 
tactics (9,669 direct references coded), normalization (6,551 direct references coded), and 
political slant (6,367 direct references coded). 
Subsequently, I found the Wall Street Journal used such sensationalizing terror 
tactics more than two times that of the other three news outlets put together, albeit the 
Wall Street Journal contained substantially more subscriber commentary. The Wall Street 
Journal and the NY Times used sensationalizing terror tactics to draw attention to 
specific political points. Additionally, the Wall Street Journal contained significantly 
more political slant than the other news outlets. While the NY Post and the NY Daily 
News employed more terror tactics, the NY Daily News used them nearly twice as much 
as the NY Post. These findings indicated that all four news outlets included normalizing 
language to socially constructed stories of lone wolf terrorist events aligned with their 
political continuums. 
Chapter 4 included (a) the setting, (b) demographics, (c) data collection, (d) data 




including (a) interpretation of findings, (b) recommendations, (c) implications, and (d) 






Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
My purpose with this phenomenological study was to identify whether social 
construction in journalistic reporting normalized radical lone wolf terrorism considering 
journalistic content and political slant. This research was vital because social 
normalization of radical lone wolf terrorism could influence societal changes legitimizing 
lone wolf terrorist activities, thus, increasing terrorist attacks and endangering countless 
lives. My findings, founded on Borum’s (2012a) four-stage pathway mindset model of 
terrorism and Berger and Luckmann’s (1966) social construction theory, confirmed that 
the publications’ slanted reporting practices created altered social constructions, thereby 
normalizing terroristic activities. 
Interpretation of Findings 
My findings confirmed substantial terrorist normalization considering journalistic, 
political slant within the four major NYC newspaper publications reporting the four NYC 
terrorist events from 2010 to 2017. I found that political policy and political opinion were 
often injected into journalistic reports when highlighting terrorist events and that reports 
sensationalized to further political ideologies. This concept aligned succinctly with 
Borum’s (2012a) four-stage pathway mindset model of terrorism and Berger and 
Luckmann’s (1966) social construction theory. Thus, a socially constructed messaging 
platform based on the norms and values integrated into society by that journalistic 
normalization was present. Thematic analyses demonstrated notable journalistic trends of 
terror tactics combined with political slant emphasized with words like terrorist, terror 




Prior literature demonstrated similar terroristic manipulation using fear to assert 
power over a populace (Crenshaw, 2000). In my personal and professional experience, 
society relied on news reports for critical health and safety-related data, altercasting 
journalists with responsibility for accurate and complete news coverage. However, during 
the four terrorist events analyzed, all four news outlets sensationalized those events to 
create fear, exacerbated the facts, and normalized society according to each outlet’s 
political slant. Aligning my findings with prior work, like Ruigrok and van Atteveldt 
(2007), such journalistic normalization is not uncommon. Ruigrok and Atteveldt found 
that journalists presented news by selectively framing events, thus influencing event 
relevance into contexts more salient to a particular interpretation or evaluation. Applying 
Borum’s (2012a) model, this type of societal manipulation serves to further terroristic 
mindsets. 
Interpretations Associated With Borum’s Model 
My findings demonstrated that journalistic reporting normalized lone wolf 
terrorist behavior, which, according to the attribution stage of Borum’s (2012a) four-
stage pathway mindset model, maligns and dehumanizes a group or individual. 
According to Borum, once a group or individual feels held socially accountable or 
blamed for a given situation, they are altercasted as an undesirable, anti-social outcast. 
Borum noted that once the group or individual perceives this malignment or 
dehumanization, they extend that perception to all people, thereby extending their 
hostilities to all society. Therefore, by applying Borum’s model, journalistic terror tactics 




journalistic normalization. Following Borum’s pathway, sensational, terrorizing, and 
politically slanted news reports lead to further terrorism if left unchecked. Such 
journalistic trends are not just detrimental to the would-be terrorist; in line with Berger 
and Luckmann’s (1966) theory, those journalistic trends additionally adversely socially 
construct society. 
Interpretations Associated With Berger and Luckmann’s Theory 
Societal reality centers on social norms and values, which Berger and Luckmann 
(1966) explained are socially constructed and become a normal part of society. Berger 
and Luckmann posited that society creates opinions about things and ideas, thereby 
constructing normal society by those opinions. According to Berger and Luckmann, 
people develop these normalizing opinions by listening to and reading the opinions of 
others, thus, through news outlets.  
I found that all four news outlets used terror tactics to politically slant reports of 
the terroristic events detailed in this study, thereby constructing and normalizing their 
readers’ societies accordingly. Moreover, I found this normalizing social construction 
reflected through the thematic trends of terror tactics and political slant exposed in the 
results via word content, journalistic framing, and social construction when describing 
the terrorist events. Thus, my findings confirmed that each newspaper was culpable of 
socially constructing societal norms through politically slanting reports, commentary, and 





As anticipated, I encountered personal bias, coding and interpretation, and limited 
citizen representation considering the NYC confines and four news outlet narratives of 
the four terrorist events. Subsequently, I recorded my thoughts, opinions, and 
considerations throughout data collection, coding, and analyses to identify biases, 
interpretation variations, and representation ranges. Furthermore, I frequently and 
repeatedly reviewed and compared these notations with coding and interpretation to 
minimalize those limitations. As a native New Yorker and a 9/11 first responder, I 
sometimes felt personally connected to the stories and events. However, I limited my 
personal bias using my journal notes, as I anticipated in Chapter 3. 
I countered journalistic inconsistencies by using thematic analyses to analyze the 
data and identify themes and patterns, thus improving consistencies throughout the study. 
For example, the excessive amount of commentary in the Wall Street Journal was 
inconsistent with the other news outlets. However, my strict analysis processes enabled 
individual dissection, adding consistency to coding, theme, and pattern identification. 
Additionally, I detailed all such inconsistencies and my approaches to them in my journal 
for further analysis. 
I included a wide-range political continuum, subscriber commentary, and 
circulation to counter representation limitations, representing the broadest NYC 
representation possible for this qualitative study. The four news outlets represented the 
entire political spectrum, from conservative to liberal. I coded and analyzed subscriber 




selected represented the most popular, most circulated new outlets in NYC. Admittedly, 
those four news outlets were not the only news outlets covering events in NYC. Thus, I 
remain confident that my findings represent a substantial portion of the population along 
every political spectrum. Therefore, even though I may not have considered all opinions 
in NYC, my results still revealed journalistic societal normalization; subsequently, I 
highly recommend further action. 
The main limitation challenging transferability was my delimitations to the four 
specific events and the four specific news outlets. Even so, I feel that transferability is 
plausible to similar-sized major metropolitan areas in the United States, given the broad 
political representation I used. Moving forward, I recommend further similar research 
centered on different geographic regions and using different news outlets to expand on 
scientific understandings of journalistic influences on normalizing social constructs. 
Recommendations 
While my findings begin building the body of knowledge concerning normalizing 
journalistic social construction, further research will expand the scientific understanding 
of journalism’s role in constructing and normalizing society. Throughout my research, I 
found minimal literature on terrorism considering social construction, which considerably 
hinders disseminating terroristic data types. Therefore, I highly recommend further 
research on topics including (a) the relationship between news outlets and terrorist 
actions, (b) the relationship between social construction and terrorist behavior, and (c) the 
effects of journalistic societal normalization and social construction on terrorism. In 




report data and their feelings about un- or misreported data could provide additional 
insight to this study. Further research in these areas may help expand scientific 
knowledge by explaining how terrorist behavior ties to social construction and media 
bias, leading to public policy strategies to minimalize normalizing terrorist behavior into 
normal social constructs. 
Based on my findings, my current recommendations for public policy include 
developing policy that: 
a) Establishes fundamental procedure sets for journalists covering stories dealing 
with terrorist issues 
b) Requires journalists to inform the public when not all the facts are included or 
confirmed 
c) Mandates that the journalist note when an investigation is incomplete; thus, 
the report is incomplete 
d) Obliges the journalist to differentiate their opinion from established fact 
e) Demands the journalist vet and confirm reports with an appointed, reputable 
data source such as an official event liaison.  
Implications 
The implications of my findings include furthering social science understanding 
of the normalizing social construction of the media, which influences public policy and 
drives social change. Because social norms impact how society thinks and feels about 
terrorism, implications apply to individuals, families, organizations, and society. The 




understanding of terrorism and terrorist events. On the family level, implications included 
improving awareness about how terrorist events impact family life and the importance of 
family readiness and social awareness. From an organizational standpoint, the 
implications include improving social and societal policies designed to address terrorism 
in the workplace. Finally, at a societal level, implications from my findings could further 
public policy development leading to a safer society minimizing terrorism. 
Implications to Public Policy 
In my opinion, public policy addresses outstanding issues by working cohesively 
with local political leaders, the news media, enforcement officials, and the public. 
Therefore, public and safety officials rely on news reports for crucial information that 
differentiates fact from fiction regardless of varying political propaganda. Thus, news 
agencies have a public responsibility to report the facts without inserting their slant and 
opinion. Such legitimate reporting would improve community awareness and policy 
development about terrorism, communication, safety, health, and much more. For 
example, law enforcement could enhance community relationships and foster productive 
responses to terrorist events with reliable information. Furthermore, forging trustworthy, 
honest relationships built from public policy based on accurate data naturally drives 
positive social change.  
Implications to Social Change 
The potential impact for positive social change lies in the message communicated 
through journalistic reporting and includes improved health, safety, communication, and 




think and behave by developing and normalizing social constructs. Thus, if social 
constructs extend from reliable data rather than terroristic political sensationalism, the 
resulting societal normalization will build from knowledge rather than opinion and 
speculation.  
Such reliable data could provide the community with tangible credible 
information to create preparedness plans and strategies for terrorist events. For example, 
private and public organizations could implement drills and safe practice responses to 
terrorist events. In addition, local fire departments, emergency medical technicians, 
hospitals, police departments, sanitation, environmental protection, parks department, and 
more could benefit from reliable information. Thus, the entire community and municipal 
agencies could work together to create an effective prepared response that would assist 
all citizens. 
Practice Recommendations 
Connecting recommendations with implications requires putting practical 
strategies in routine practice. Such recommended practice would limit slanted opinions, 
provide facts, and allow the readers to decipher critical data while improving content and 
reliable journalistic reporting. Thus, problem-solving considerations must go beyond 
policy verbiage to implanted practice. Some potential problem-solving practices include:  
a) Incorporating more newspaper data from other news outlets throughout 
the United States thereby providing a comprehensive perspective about 




b) Creating a newspaper database so that outlets can share information with 
the public on local emergency response and relay questions to appropriate 
response agencies  
c) Create training networks for journalists on the importance of limiting 
slanted opinions and reporting facts as they occur in real-time 
Conclusion 
A word can associate fear, meaning, and ‘rally the troops,’ so to speak. This tactic 
is evidence that often, a writer will write to that “base.” This instigation occurred with the 
Capital siege on January 6, 2021, related to the words used to report that news. Think 
about the word I just used: siege rather than criminal trespassing. Siege conjures up an 
image, an image with passionate meaning. A pirate conducts a ‘siege’ as we see in the 
movies. Your annoying neighbor may trespass on your front lawn—both stories reported 
with different words, feelings, and social construction. Nevertheless, both words are 
interchangeable depending on the emphasis that the user desires to communicate. 
In my experience, words conjure images and feelings associated with those 
words, and the English language contains a plethora of words with the same or similar 
meanings. For example, my neighbor could say I walked or trespassed on their lawn or 
could claim I laid siege to their lawn. The different descriptions of the same act lead the 
listener (or reader) to very different conclusions resulting in drastically different events. 
One is a minor infraction, and the other a severe crime. I found this type of distortion 





Citizens; private, public, and governmental organizations; and emergency 
responders of all types rely on news outlets for immediate updates on terroristic events to 
keep communities safe. However, my findings demonstrate that news agencies in NYC 
used terror tactics to politically slant their reports, resulting in the normalization of 
terroristic social constructs that further preset political agendas. For the populace to be 
accurately informed and prepared, regardless of political party affiliation, news agencies 
must report accurate unmanipulated facts rather than the slanted, socially constructed 
framing I found during all four events I researched. Instead, the four news outlets I 
investigated spun narratives, thereby translating events to infer political ideologies that 
suited the news outlets’ end political goals. I found that this manipulative practice was 
prevalent among all four major NYC news agencies. 
Such unreliable information indicated a disconnect between facts and opinion, 
which significantly impacts community safety. For policymakers, this disconnect means 
that effective policies do not exist to help mitigate terrorist events and, thus, do not make 
the community safer. Therefore, public doubt about policymaker competence becomes 
questionable. In addition, when real-time events do not get reported accurately, the 
emergency response becomes hindered, affecting operational response and community 
safety. 
When journalists report terrorist events by socially constructing and normalizing 
actions according to biased or slanted conceptions, they place the entire populace in 
danger. Therefore, it is incumbent for journalists to report the facts credibly as they 




people instilled in them. Willful blindness is unacceptable to the people, the emergency 
responders, the policymakers, and the communities entrusting journalists to report and 
provide vital information. Crucial, life-saving decisions use critical information; 
information journalists from the four news agencies I analyzed manipulated to construct 
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